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Abstract
We consider coding schemes for computationally bounded channels, which can introduce an
arbitrary set of errors as long as (a) the fraction of errors is bounded with high probability
by a parameter p and (b) the process which adds the errors can be described by a sufficiently
“simple” circuit. Codes for such channel models are attractive since, like codes for standard
adversarial errors, they can handle channels whose true behavior is unknown or varying over
time.
For two classes of channels, we provide explicit, efficiently encodable/decodable codes of
optimal rate where only inefficiently decodable codes were previously known. In each case,
we provide one encoder/decoder that works for every channel in the class. The encoders are
randomized, and probabilities are taken over the (local, unknown to the decoder) coins of the
encoder and those of the channel.
Unique decoding for additive errors: We give the first construction of a polynomial-time
encodable/decodable code for additive (a.k.a. oblivious) channels that achieve the Shannon
capacity 1−H(p). These are channels which add an arbitrary error vector e ∈ {0, 1}N of weight
at most pN to the transmitted word; the vector e can depend on the code but not on the
particular transmitted word. Such channels capture binary symmetric errors and burst errors
as special cases.
List-decoding for polynomial-time channels: For every constant c > 0, we give a Monte Carlo
construction of an code with optimal rate (arbitrarily close to 1−H(p)) that efficiently recovers a
short list containing the correct message with high probability for channels describable by circuits
of size at most N c. We are not aware of any channel models considered in the information theory
literature, other than purely adversarial channels, which require more than linear-size circuits
to implement. We justify the relaxation to list-decoding with an impossibility result showing
that, in a large range of parameters (p > 1/4), codes that are uniquely decodable for a modest
class of channels (online, memoryless, nonuniform channels) cannot have positive rate.
1 Introduction
The theory of error-correcting codes has had two divergent schools of thought, dating back to its
origins, based on the underlying model of the noisy channel. Shannon’s theory [34] modeled the
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channel as a stochastic process with a known probability law. Hamming’s work [19] suggested a
worst-case/adversarial model, where the channel is subject only to a limit on the number of errors
it may cause.
These two approaches share several common tools, however in terms of quantitative results,
the classical results in the harsher Hamming model are much weaker. For instance, for the binary
symmetric channel which flips each transmitted bit independently with probability p < 1/2, the
optimal rate of reliable transmission is known to be the Shannon capacity 1 − H(p), where H(·)
is the binary entropy function [34]. Concatenated codes (Forney [13]) and polar codes (Arikan [3])
can transmit at rates arbitrarily close to this capacity and are efficiently decodable. In contrast,
for adversarial channels that can corrupt up to a fraction p of symbols in an arbitrary manner,
the optimal rate is unknown in general, though it is known for all p ∈ (0, 12) that the rate has to
be much smaller than the Shannon capacity. In fact, for p ∈ [14 , 12), the achievable rate over an
adversarial channel is asymptotically zero, while the Shannon capacity 1−H(p) remains positive.
Codes that tolerate worst-case errors are attractive because they assume nothing about the
distribution of the errors introduced by the channel, only a bound on the number of errors. Thus,
they can be used to transmit information reliably over a large range of channels whose true behavior
is unknown or varies over time. In contrast, codes tailored to a specific channel model tend to fail
when the model changes. For example, concatenated codes with a high rate outer code, which can
transmit efficiently and reliably at the Shannon capacity with i.i.d. errors, fail miserably in the
presence of burst errors that occur in long runs.
In this paper, we consider several intermediate models of uncertain channels, as a meaningful
and well-motivated bridge between the Shannon and Hamming models. Specifically, we consider
computationally bounded channels, which can introduce an arbitrary set of errors as long as (a)
the total fraction of errors is bounded by p with high probability and (b) the process which adds
the errors can be described by a sufficiently “simple” circuit. The idea and motivation behind
these models is that natural processes may be mercurial, but are not computationally intensive.
These models are powerful enough to capture natural settings like i.i.d. and burst errors, but weak
enough to allow efficient communication arbitrarily close to the Shannon capacity 1 −H(p). The
models we study, or close variants, have been considered previously—see Section 2 for a discussion
of related work. The computational perspective we espouse is inspired by the works of Lipton [29]
and Micali et al. [30].
For two classes of channels, we provide efficiently encodable and decodable codes of optimal rate
(arbitrarily close to 1−H(p)) where only inefficiently decodable codes were previously known. In
each case, we provide one encoder/decoder that works for every channel in the class. In particular,
our results apply even when the channel’s behavior depends on the code.
Structure of this paper. We first describe the models and our results briefly (Section 1.1), and
outline our main technical contributions (Section 1.2). In Section 2, we describe related lines of
work aimed at handling (partly) adversarial errors with rates near Shannon capacity. Our results
are stated formally in Section 3. Section 4 describes our list-decoding based code constructions for
recovery from additive errors. As the needed list-decodable codes are not explicitly known, this only
gives an existential result. Section 5 describes the approach behind our efficient constructions at a
high-level. The remainder of the paper describes and analyzes the constructions in detail, in order
of increasing channel strength: additive errors (Section 6), and time-bounded errors (Section 7).
The appendices contain extra details on the building blocks in our constructions (A), results for the
“average” error criterion (B) and our impossibility result showing the necessity of list decoding for
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error fractions exceeding 1/4 (C), respectively (see Section 3 for formal statements of these claims).
1.1 Our results
The encoders we construct are stochastic (that is, randomized). Probabilities are taken over the
(local, unknown to the decoder) coins of the encoder and the choices of the channel; messages may
be chosen adversarially and known to the channel. Our results do not assume any setup or shared
randomness between the encoder and decoder.
Unique decoding for additive channels. We give the first explicit construction of stochastic
codes with polynomial-time encoding/decoding algorithms that approach the Shannon capacity
1−H(p) for additive (a.k.a. oblivious) channels. These are channels which add an arbitrary error
vector e ∈ {0, 1}N of Hamming weight at most pN to the transmitted codeword (of length N).
The error vector may depend on the code and the message but, crucially, not on the encoder’s
local random coins. Additive errors capture binary symmetric errors as well as certain models
of correlated errors, like burst errors. For a deterministic encoder, the additive error model is
equivalent to the usual adversarial error model. A randomized encoder is thus necessary to achieve
the Shannon capacity.
We also provide a novel, simple proof that (inefficient) capacity-achieving codes exist for additive
channels. We do so by combining linear list-decodable codes with rate approaching 1−H(p) (known
to exist, but not known to be efficiently decodable) with a special type of authentication scheme.
Previous existential proofs relied on complex random coding arguments [6, 26]; see the discussion
of related work below.
Necessity of list decoding for richer channel models. The additive errors model postulates
that the error vector has to be picked obliviously, before seeing the codeword. To model more
complex processes, we will allow the channel to see the codeword and decide upon the error as a
function of the codeword. We will stipulate a computational restriction on how the channel might
decide what error pattern to cause. The simplest restriction (beyond the additive/oblivious case) is
a “memoryless” channel that decides the action on the i’th bit based only on that bit (and perhaps
some internal state that is oblivious to the codeword).
First, we show that even against such memoryless channels, reliable unique decoding with
positive rate is impossible when p > 1/4. The idea is that even a memoryless adversary can make
the transmitted codeword difficult to distinguish from a different, random codeword. The proof
relies on the requirement that a single code must work for all channels, since the “hard” channel
depends on the code.
Thus, to communicate at a rate close to 1 − H(p) for all p, we consider the relaxation to
list-decoding : the decoder is allowed to output a small list of messages, one of which is correct.
List-decodable codes with rate approaching 1−H(p) are known to exist even for adversarial errors
[40, 12]. However, constructing efficient (i.e., polynomial-time encodable and decodable) binary
codes for list decoding with near-optimal rate is a major open problem.1 Therefore, our goal is to
exploit the computational restrictions on the channel to get efficiently list-decodable codes.
Computationally bounded channels. We consider channels whose behavior on N -bit inputs is
described by a circuit of size T(N) (for example T(N) = O(N2)). We sometimes call this the time-
bounded model, and refer to T(·) as a time bound. We do not know of any channel models considered
1Over large alphabets, explicit optimal rate list-decodable codes are known.
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in the information theory literature, other than purely adversarial channels, which require more
than linear time to implement.
We also discuss (online) space-bounded channels; these channels make a single pass over the
transmitted codeword, deciding which locations to corrupt as they go, and are limited to storing
at most S(N) bits (that is, they can be describe by one-pass branching programs of width at most
2S(N)). Logarithmic space channels, in particular, can be realized by polynomial-size circuits.
List decoding for polynomial time channels. Our main contribution for time-bounded chan-
nels is a construction of polynomial-time encodable and list-decodable codes that approach the
optimal rate for channels whose time bound is a polynomial in the block length N . Specifically, we
give an efficiently computable encoding function, Enc, that stochastically encodes the message m
into Enc(m; r) where r is private randomness chosen at the encoder, such that for every message
m and time N c-bounded channel W, the decoder takes W(Enc(m; r)) as input and returns a small
list of messages that, with high probability over r and the coins of the channel, contains the real
message m. The size of the list is polynomial in 1/ε, where N(1 −H(p) − ε) is the length of the
transmitted messages. We stress that the decoder does not know the choice of random bits r made
at the encoder.
The construction of our encoding function Enc(·, ·) is Monte Carlo — we give a randomized
construction of Enc that (together with the decoder) offers the claimed properties (for all messages
and N c-bounded channels) with high probability. The sampling step is polynomial time, and
the resulting function Enc(m; r) can be computed from m, r in deterministic polynomial time.
However, we do not know how to efficiently check and certify that a particular random choice
is guaranteed to have the claimed properties. Obtaining fully explicit constructions remains an
intriguing open problem. In the case of polynomial time bounded channels, it seems unlikely that
solve the problem without additional complexity assumptions (such as the existence of certain
pseudorandom generators). In the case of online logspace-bounded channel, it may be possible
to obtain fully explicit constructions without complexity assumptions (using, for example, Nisan’s
pseudorandom generators for logspace). We will elaborate on this aspect in Section 8.
One technicality is that the decoder need not return all words within a distance pN of the
received word (as is the case for the standard “combinatorial” notion of list decoding), but it must
return the correct message as one of the candidates with high probability. This notion of list-
decoding is natural for stochastic codes in communication applications. In fact, it is exactly the
notion that is needed in constructions which “sieve” the list, such as [15, 30], and one application of
our results is a uniquely decodable code for the public-key model (assuming a specific polynomial
time bound), strengthening results of [30]. See the discussion of related work in Section 2 for a
more precise statement.
For both the additive and time-bounded models, our constructions require new methods for
applying tools from cryptography and derandomization to coding-theoretic problems. We give a
brief high-level discussion of these techniques next. An expanded overview the approach behind
our code construction appears in Section 5.
1.2 Techniques
Control/payload construction. In our constructions, we develop several new techniques. The
first is a novel “reduction” from the standard coding setting with no setup to the setting of shared
secret randomness. In models in which errors are distributed evenly, such a reduction is relatively
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simple [1]; however, this reduction fails against adversarial errors. Instead, we show how to hide
the secret randomness (the control information) inside the main codeword (the payload) in such
a way that the decoder can learn the control information but (a) the control information remains
hidden to a bounded channel and (b) its encoding is robust to a certain, weaker class of errors. We
feel this technique should be useful in other settings of bounded adversarial behavior.
Our reduction can also be viewed as a novel way of bootstrapping from “small” codes, which
can be decoded by brute force, to “large” codes, which can be decoded efficiently. The standard
way to do this is via concatenation; unfortunately, concatenation does not work well even against
mildly unpredictable models, such as the additive error model.
Pseudorandomness. Second, our results further develop a surprising connection between coding
and pseudorandomness. Hiding the “control information” from the channel requires us to make
different settings of the control information indistinguishable from the channel’s point of view.
Thus, our proofs apply techniques from cryptography together with constructions of pseudorandom
objects (generators, permutations, and samplers) from derandomization. Typically, the “tests”
that must be fooled are compositions of the channel (which we assume has low complexity) with
some subroutine of the decoder (which we design to have low complexity). The connection to
pseudorandomness appeared in a simpler form in the previous work on bounded channels [29, 14, 30];
our use of this connection is significantly more delicate.
The necessary pseudorandom permutations and samplers can be explicitly constructed, and
the construction of the needed complexity-theoretic pseudorandom generators is where we uses
randomness in our construction. For the case of additive errors, information-theoretic objects that
we can construct deterministically efficiently (such as t-wise independent strings) suffice and we get
a fully explicit construction.
2 Background and Related Previous Work
There are several lines of work aimed at handling adversarial, or partly adversarial, errors with
rates near the Shannon capacity. We survey them briefly here and highlight the relationship to our
results.
List decoding. List decoding was introduced in the late 1950s [11, 38] and has witnessed a lot of
recent algorithmic work (cf. the survey [16]). Under list decoding, the decoder outputs a small list
of messages that must include the correct message. Random coding arguments demonstrate that
there exist binary codes of rate 1−H(p)−ε which can tolerate pN adversarial errors if the decoder is
allowed to output a list of size O(1/ε) [12, 40, 17]. The explicit construction of binary list-decodable
codes with rate close to 1−H(p), however, remains a major open question. We provide such codes
for the special case of corruptions introduced by space- or time-bounded channels.
Adding Setup—Shared Randomness. Another relaxation is to allow randomized coding strate-
gies where the sender and receiver share “secret” randomness, hidden from the channel, which is
used to pick a particular, deterministic code at random from a family of codes. Such randomized
strategies were called private codes in [25]. Using this secret shared randomness, one can transmit
at rates approaching 1 − H(p) against adversarial errors (for example, by randomly permuting
the symbols and adding a random offset [29, 25]). Using explicit codes achieving capacity on the
BSCp [13], one can even get such randomized codes of rate approaching 1 − H(p) explicitly (al-
though getting an explicit construction with o(n) randomness remains an open problem [35]). A
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related notion of setup is the public key model of Micali et al. [30], in which the sender generates a
public key that is known to the receiver and possibly to the channel. This model only makes sense
for computationally bounded channels, discussed below.
Our constructions are the first (for all three models) which achieve rate 1−H(p) with efficient
decoding and no setup assumptions.
AVCs: Oblivious, nonuniform errors. A different approach to modeling uncertain channels is
embodied by the rich literature on arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs), surveyed in [28]. Despite
being extensively investigated in the information theory literature, AVCs have not received much
algorithmic attention.
An AVC is specified by a finite state space S and a family of memoryless channels {Ws : s ∈ S}.
The channel’s behavior is governed by its state, which is allowed to vary arbitrarily. The AVC’s
behavior in a particular execution is specified by a vector ~s = (s1, ..., sN ) ∈ SN : the channel applies
the operation Wsi to the ith bit of the codeword. A code for the AVC is required to transmit
reliably with high probability for every sequence ~s, possibly subject to some state constraint. Thus
AVCs model uncertainty via the nonuniform choice of the state vector ~s ∈ SN . However — and
this is the one of the key differences that makes the bounded space model more powerful — the
choice of vector ~s in an AVC is oblivious to the codeword; that is, the channel cannot look at the
codeword to decide the state sequence.
The additive errors channel we consider is captured by the AVC framework. Indeed, consider
the simple AVC where S = {0, 1} and when in state s, the channel adds s mod 2 to the input bit.
With the state constraint
∑N
i=1 si 6 pN on the state sequence (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) of the AVC, this
models additive errors, where an arbitrary error vector e with at most p fraction of 1’s is added to
the codeword by the channel, but e is chosen obliviously of the codeword.
Csisza´r and Narayan determined the capacity of AVCs with state constraints [7, 8]. In particular,
for the additive case, they showed that random codes can achieve rate approaching 1 − H(p)
while correcting any specific error pattern e of weight pN with high probability.2 Note that codes
providing this guarantee cannot be linear, since the bad error vectors are the same for all codewords
in a linear code. The decoding rule used in [7] to prove this claim was quite complex, and it was
simplified to the more natural closest codeword rule in [8]. Langberg [26] revisited this special
case (which he called an oblivious channel) and gave another proof of the above claim, based on a
different random coding argument.
As outlined above, we provide two results for this model. First, we give a new, more modular
existential proof. More importantly, we provide the first explicit constructions of codes for this
model which achieve the optimal rate 1−H(p).
Polynomial-time bounded channels. In a different vein, Lipton [29] considered channels whose
behavior can be described by a polynomial-time algorithm. He showed how a small amount of
secret shared randomness (the seed for a pseudorandom generator) could be used to communicate
at the Shannon capacity over any polynomial-time channel that introduces a bounded number of
errors. Micali et al. [30] gave a similar result in a public key model; however, their result relies on
efficiently list-decodable codes, which are only known with sub-optimal rate. Both results assume
2The AVC literature usually discusses the “average error criterion”, in which the code is deterministic but the
message is assumed to be uniformly random and unknown to the channel. We prefer the “stochastic encoding” model,
in which the message is chosen adversarially, but the encoder has local random coins. The stochastic encoding model
strictly stronger than the Average error model as long as the decoder recovers the encoder’s random coins along with
message. The arguments of Czisza´r and Narayan [7] and Langberg [26] also apply to the stronger model.
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the existence of one-way functions and some kind of setup. On the positive side, in both cases the
channel’s time bound need not be known explicitly ahead of time; one gets a trade-off between the
channel’s time and its probability of success.
Our list decoding result removes the setup assumptions of [29, 30] at the price of imposing a
specific polynomial bound on the channel’s running time and relaxing to list-decoding. However,
our result also implies stronger unique decoding results in the public-key model [30]. Specifically,
our codes can be plugged into the construction of Micali et al. to get unique decoding at rates
up to the Shannon capacity when the sender has a public key known to the decoder (and possibly
to the channel). The idea, roughly, is to sign messages before encoding them; see [30] for details.
We remark that while they make use of list-decodable codes in the usual sense where all close-by
codewords can be found, our weaker notion (where we find a list that includes the original message
with high probability) suffices for the application.
Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai [32] and Hemenway and Ostrosky [22] considered the construction
of locally decodable codes in the presence of computationally bounded errors assuming some setup
(private [32] and public [22] keys, respectively). The techniques used for locally decodable codes
are quite different from those used in more traditional coding settings; we do not know if the ideas
from our constructions can be used to remove the setup assumptions from [32, 22].
Logarithmic-space channels. Galil et al. [14] considered a slightly weaker model, logarithmic
space, that still captures most physically realizable channels. They modeled the channel as a finite
automaton with polynomially-many states. Using Nisan’s generator for log-space machines [31],
they removed the assumption of one-way functions from Lipton’s construction in the shared ran-
domness model [29].
In the initial version of this paper, we considered nonuniform generalization of their model which
also generalizes arbitrarily varying channels. Our result for polynomial-time bounded channels,
which implies a construction for logarithmic-space channels, removes the assumption of shared
setup in the model of [14] but achieves only list decoding. This relaxation is necessary for some
parameter ranges, since unique decoding in this model is impossible when p > 1/4.
Causal channels. The logarithmic-space channel can also be seen as a restriction of online, or
causal, channels, recently studied by Dey, Jaggi and Langberg [9, 27]. These channels make a
single-pass through the codeword, introducing errors as they go. They are not restricted in either
space usage or computation time. It is known that codes for online channels cannot achieve the
Shannon rate; specifically, the achievable asymptotic rate is at most max(1− 4p, 0) [9] (and in fact
slightly tighter bounds were recently discovered [10]). Our impossibility result, which shows that
the rate of codes for time- or space-bounded channels is asymptotically 0 for p > 14 , can be seen as a
partial extension of the online channels results of [9, 27, 10] to computationally-bounded channels,
though our proof technique is quite different.
3 Statements of Results
Recall the notion of stochastic codes: A stochastic binary code of rate R ∈ (0, 1) and block length N
is given by an encoding function Enc : {0, 1}RN ×{0, 1}b → {0, 1}N which encodes the RN message
bits, together with some additional random bits (b of them), into an N -bit codeword. Here, N and
b are integers, and we assume for simplicity that RN is an integer.
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3.1 Codes for worst-case additive errors
Existential result via list decoding. We give a novel construction of stochastic codes for additive
errors by combining linear list-decodable codes with a certain kind of authentication code called
algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes. Such AMD codes can detect additive corruption
with high probability, and were defined and constructed for cryptographic applications in [5]. The
linearity of the list-decodable code is therefore crucial to make the combination with AMD codes
work. The linearity ensures that the spurious messages output by the list-decoder are all additive
offsets of the true message and depend only on the error vector (and not on m, r). An additional
feature of our construction is that even when the fraction of errors exceeds p, the decoder outputs a
decoding failure with high probability (rather than decoding incorrectly). This feature is important
when using these codes as a component in our explicit construction, mentioned next.
The formal result is stated below. Details can be found in Section 4. The notation Ωp,ε expresses
an asymptotic lower bound in which p and ε are held constant.
Theorem 3.1. For every p, 0 < p < 1/2 and every ε > 0, there exists a family of stochastic codes of
rate R > 1−H(p)−ε and a deterministic (exponential time) decoder Dec : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}RN∪{⊥}
such that for every m ∈ {0, 1}RN and every error vector e ∈ {0, 1}N of Hamming weight at most
pN , Prr
[
Dec
(
Enc(m, r) + e
)
= m
]
> 1 − 2−Ωp,ε(N). Moreover, when more than a fraction p of
errors occur, the decoder is able to detect this and report a decoding failure (⊥) with probability at
least 1− 2−Ωp,ε(N).
Given an explicit family of linear binary codes of rate R that can be efficiently list-decoded from
fraction p of errors with list-size bounded by a polynomial function in N , one can construct an
explicit stochastic code of rate R− o(1) with the above guarantee along with an efficient decoder.
Explicit, efficient codes achieving capacity. Explicit binary list-decodable codes of optimal
rate are not known, so one cannot use the above connection to construct explicit stochastic codes of
rate ≈ 1−H(p) for pN additive errors. Nevertheless, we give an explicit construction of capacity-
achieving stochastic codes against worst-case additive errors. The construction is described at a
high-level in Section 5 and in further detail in Section 6.
Theorem 3.2. For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), every ε > 0, and infinitely many N , there is an explicit,
efficient stochastic code of block length N and rate R > 1 − H(p) − ε which corrects a p fraction
of additive errors with probability 1 − o(1). Specifically, there are polynomial time algorithms Enc
and Dec such that for every message m ∈ {0, 1}RN and every error vector e of Hamming weight at
most pN , we have Prr[Dec(Enc(m; r) + e) = m] = 1− exp(−Ωp,ε(N/ log2N)).
A slight modification of our construction gives codes for the “average error criterion,” in which
the code is deterministic but the message is assumed to be uniformly random and unknown to the
channel (see Appendix B).
3.2 Unique decoding is impossible for nonoblivious channels when p > 1
4
We exhibit a very simple “zero space” (aka memoryless) channel that rules out achieving any
positive rate (i.e., the capacity is zero) when p > 1/4. In each position, the channel either leaves the
transmitted bit alone, sets it to 0, or sets it to 1. The channel works by “pushing” the transmitted
codeword towards a different valid codeword (selected at random). This simple channel adds at
most n/4 errors in expectation. We can get a channel with a hard bound on the number of errors
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by allowing it logarithmic space. Our impossibility result can be seen as strengthening a result by
Dey et al. [9] for online channels in the special case where p > 1/4, though our proof technique,
adapted from Ahlswede [1], is quite different. Appendix C contains a detailed proof.
Theorem 3.3 (Unique decoding is impossible for p > 14). For every pair of randomized encod-
ing/decoding algorithms Enc,Dec that make N uses of the channel and use a message space whose
size tends to infinity with N , for every 0 < ν < 14 , there is an online space-dlog(N)e channel W2
that alters at most N(14 + ν) bits and causes a uniformly random message to be incorrectly decoded
with probability at least C · ν for an absolute constant C.
3.3 List-decodable codes for polynomial-time channels
We next consider a very general noise model. The channel can look at the whole codeword, and
effect any error pattern, with the only restriction being that the channel must compute the error
pattern in polynomial time given the original codeword as input. In fact, we will even allow non-
uniformity, and require that the error pattern be computable by a polynomial size circuit.
Theorem 3.4. For all constants ε > 0, p ∈ (0, 1/2), and c > 1, and for infinitely many integers
N , there exists a Monte Carlo construction (succeeding with probability 1−N−Ω(1)) of a stochastic
code of block length N and rate R > 1−H(p)−ε with NO(c) time encoding/list decoding algorithms
(Enc,Dec) that have the following property: For all messages m ∈ {0, 1}RN , and all pN -bounded
channels W that are implementable by a size O(N c) circuit, Dec(W(Enc(m; r))) outputs a list of at
most poly(1/ε) messages that includes the real message m with probability at least 1−N−Ω(1).
4 Simple, nonexplicit codes for worst-case additive errors
In this section, we will demonstrate how to use good linear list-decodable codes to get good stochas-
tic codes. The conversion uses the list-decodable code as a black-box and loses only a negligible
amount in rate. In particular, by using binary linear codes that achieve list decoding capacity,
we get stochastic codes which achieve the capacity for additive errors. The linearity of the code is
crucial for this construction. The other ingredient we need for the construction is an authentication
code (called an algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code) that can detect additive corruption
with high probability [5].
4.1 Some coding terminology
We begin with the definitions relating to list decoding and stochastic codes for additive errors.
Definition 4.1 (List decodable codes). For a real p, 0 < p < 1, and an integer L > 1, a code
C ⊆ Σn is said to be (p, L)-list decodable if for every y ∈ Σn there are at most L codewords of
C within Hamming distance pn from y. If for every y the list of 6 L codewords within Hamming
distance pn from y can be found in time polynomial in n, then we say C is efficiently (p, L)-list
decodable. Note that (p, 1)-list decodability is equivalent to the distance of C being greater than 2pn.
2
An efficiently (p, L)-list decodable code can be used for communication on the ADVp channel
with the guarantee that the decoder can always find a list of at most L messages that includes the
correct message.
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Definition 4.2 (Stochastic codes and their decodability). A stochastic binary code of rate R and
block length n is given by an encoding function Enc : {0, 1}Rn×{0, 1}b → {0, 1}n which encodes the
Rn message bits together with some additional random bits into an n-bit codeword.
Such a code is said to be (efficiently) p-decodable with probability 1−δ if there is a (deterministic
polynomial time computable) decoding function Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}Rn ∪ {⊥} such that for every
m ∈ {0, 1}Rn and every error vector e ∈ {0, 1}n of Hamming weight at most pn, with probability at
least 1− δ over the choice of a random string ω ∈ {0, 1}b, we have
Dec
(
Enc(m,ω) + e
)
= m .
Though we do not require it in the definition, our constructions in this section of stochastic
codes from list-decodable codes will also have the desirable property that when the number of errors
exceeds pn, with high probability the decoder will output a decoding failure rather than decoding
incorrectly.
4.2 Algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes
The following is not the most general definition of AMD codes from [5], but will suffice for our
purposes and is the one we will use.
Definition 4.3. Let G = (G1, G2, G3) be a triple of abelian groups (whose group operations are
written additively) and δ > 0 be a real. Let G = G1×G2×G3 be the product group (with component-
wise addition). An (G, δ)-algebraic manipulation code, or (G, δ)-AMD code for short, is given by a
map f : G1 ×G2 → G3 with the following property:
For every x ∈ G1, and all ∆ ∈ G, Prr∈G2
[
D((x, r, f(x, r)) + ∆) /∈ {x,⊥}] 6 δ ,
where the decoding function D : G → G1 ∪ {⊥} is given by D((x, r, s)) = x if f(x, r) = s and
⊥ otherwise. The tag size of the AMD code is defined as log |G2|+ log |G3| — it is the number of
bits the AMD encoding appends to the source. 2
Intuitively, the AMD allows one to authenticate x via a signed form (x, r, f(x, r)) so that an
adversary who manipulates the signed value by adding an offset ∆ cannot cause incorrect decoding
of some x′ 6= x. The following concrete scheme from [5] achieves near optimal tag size and we will
make use of it.
Theorem 4.4. Let F be a finite field of size q and characteristic p, and d be a positive integer
such that d+ 2 is not divisible by p. Then the function f
(d)
AMD : F
d × F→ F given by f (d)AMD(x, r) =
rd+2 +
∑d
i=1 xir
i is a
(G, d+1q )-AMD code with tag size 2 log q where G = (Fd,F,F).3
4.3 Combining list decodable and AMD codes
Using a (p, L)-list decodable code C of length n, for any error pattern e of weight at most pn,
we can recover a list of L messages that includes the correct message m. We would like to use
the stochastic portion of the encoding to allow us to unambiguously pick out m from this short
list. The key insight is that if C is a linear code, then the other (less than L) messages in the list
are all fixed offsets of m that depend only on the error pattern e. So if prior to encoding by the
3Here we mean the additive group of the vector space Fd.
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list-decodable code C, the messages are themselves encodings as per a good AMD code, and the
tag portion of the AMD code is good for these fixed L or fewer offsets, then we can uniquely detect
m from the list using the AMD code. If the tag size of the DMD code is negligible compared to
the message length, then the overall rate is essentially the same as that of the list-decodable code.
Since there exist binary linear (p, L)-list-decodable codes of rate approaching 1−H(p) for large L,
this gives stochastic codes (in fact, strongly decodable stochastic codes) of rate approaching 1−H(p)
for correcting up to a fraction p of worst-case additive errors.
Theorem 4.5 (Stochastic codes from list decoding and AMD). Let b, d be positive integers with
d odd and k = b(d + 2). Let C : Fk2 → Fn2 be the encoding function of a binary linear (p, L)-list
decodable code. Let f
(d)
AMD be the function from Theorem 4.4 for the choice F = F2b. Let C
′ be the
stochastic binary code with encoding map E : {0, 1}bd × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}n given by
E(m, r) = C
(
m, r, f
(d)
AMD(m, r)
)
.
Then if d+1
2b
6 δL , the stochastic code C ′ is strongly p-decodable with probability 1 − δ. If C is
efficiently (p, L)-list decodable, then C ′ is efficiently (and strongly) p-decodable with probability
1− δ.
Moreover, even when e has weight greater than pn, the decoder detects this and outputs ⊥ (a
decoding failure) with probability at least 1− δ.
Note that the rate of C ′ is dd+2 times the rate of C.
Proof. Fix an error vector e ∈ {0, 1}n and a message m ∈ {0, 1}bd. Suppose we pick a random r
and transmit E(m, r), so that y = E(m, r) + e was received.
The decoding function D, on input y, first runs the list decoding algorithm for C to find a list of
` 6 L messages m′1, . . . ,m′` whose encodings are within distance pn of y. It then decomposes m′i as
(mi, ri, si) in the obvious way. The decoder then checks if there is a unique index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}
for which f
(d)
AMD(mi, ri) = si. If so, it outputs (mi, ri), otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Let us now analyze the above decoder D. First consider the case when wt(e) 6 pn. In this case
we want to argue that the decoder correctly outputs (m, r) with probability at least 1− δ (over the
choice of r). Note that in this case one of the m′i’s equals (m, r, f
(d)
AMD(m, r)), say this happens for
i = 1 w.l.o.g. Therefore, the condition f
(d)
AMD(m1, r1) = s1 will be met and we only need to worry
about this happening for some i > 1 also.
Let ei = y − C(m′i) be the associated error vectors for the messages m′i. Note that e1 = e.
By linearity of C, the ei’s only depend on e; indeed if c
′
1, . . . , c
′
` are all the codewords of C within
distance pn from e, then ei = c
′
i + e. Let ∆i be the pre-image of c
′
i, i.e., c
′
i = C(∆i). Therefore we
have m′i = m
′
1 + ∆i where the ∆i’s only depend on e. By the AMD property, for each i > 1, the
probability that f
(d)
AMD(mi, ri) = si over the choice of r is at most
d+1
2b
6 δ/L. Thus with probability
at least 1−δ, none of the checks f (d)AMD(mi, ri) = si for i > 1 succeed, and the decoder thus correctly
outputs m1 = m.
In the case when wt(e) > pn, the same argument shows that the check f
(d)
AMD(mi, ri) = si passes
with probability at most δ/L for each i (including i = 1). So with probability at least 1 − δ none
of the checks pass, and the decoder outputs ⊥.
Plugging into the above theorem the existence of binary linear (p,O(1/ε))-list-decodable codes
of rate 1−H(p)− ε/2, and picking d = 2dc0/εe+ 1 for some absolute constant c0, we can conclude
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the following result on existence of stochastic codes achieving capacity for reliable communication
against additive errors.
Corollary 4.6. For every p, 0 < p < 1/2 and every ε > 0, there exists a family of stochastic codes
of rate at least 1 − H(p) − ε, which are strongly p-decodable with probability at least 1 − 2−c(ε,p)n
where n is the block length and c(ε, p) is a constant depending only on ε and p.
Moreover, when more than a fraction p of errors occur, the code is able to detect this and report a
decoding failure with probability at least 1− 2−c(ε,p)n.
Remark 1. For the above construction, if the decoding succeeds, it correctly computes in addition
to the message m also the randomness r used at the encoder. So the construction also gives deter-
ministic codes for the “average error criterion” where for every error vector, all but an exponentially
small fraction of messages are communicated correctly. See Appendix B for a discussion of codes
for this model and their relation to stochastic codes for additive errors.
5 Overview of Explicit Constructions
Codes for Additive Errors. Our result is obtained by combining several ingredients from pseu-
dorandomness and coding theory. At a high level the idea (introduced by Lipton [29] in the context
of shared randomness) is that if we permute the symbols of the codewords randomly after the error
pattern is fixed, then the adversarial error pattern looks random to the decoder. Therefore, an
explicit code CBSC that can achieve capacity for the binary symmetric channel (such as Forney’s
concatenated code [13]) can be used to communicate on ADVp after the codeword’s symbols are
randomly permuted. This allows one to achieve capacity against adversarial errors when the en-
coder and decoder share randomness that is unknown to the adversary causing the errors. But,
crucially, this requires the decoder to know the random permutation used for encoding.
Our encoder communicates the random permutation (in encoded form) also as part of the overall
codeword, without relying on any shared randomness, public key, or other “extra” information. The
decoder must be able to figure out the permutation correctly, based solely on a noisy version of
the overall codeword (that encodes the permutation plus the actual data). The seed used to pick
this random permutation (plus some extra random seeds needed for the construction) is encoded
by a low rate code that can correct several errors (say, a Reed-Solomon code) and this information
is dispersed into randomly located blocks of the overall codeword (see Figure 1). The locations of
the control blocks are picked by a “sampler” — the seed for this sampler is also part of the control
information along with the seed for the random permutation.
The key challenge is to ensure that the decoder can figure out which blocks encode the control
information, and which blocks consist of “data” bits from the codeword of CBSC (the “payload”
codeword) that encodes the actual message. The control blocks (which comprise a tiny portion of
the overall codeword) are further encoded by a stochastic code (call it the control code) that can
correct somewhat more than a fraction p, say a fraction p+ ε, of errors. These codes can have any
constant rate — since they encode a small portion of the message their rate is not so important,
so we can use explicit sub-optimal codes for this purpose.
Together with the random placement of the encoded control blocks, the control code ensures
that a reasonable (Ω(ε)) fraction of the control blocks (whose encodings by the control code incur
fewer than p + ε errors) will be correctly decoded. Moreover, blocks with too many errors will be
flagged as erasures with high probability. The fraction of correctly recovered control blocks will be
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Figure 1: Schematic description of encoder from Algorithm 1.
large enough that all the control information can be recovered by decoding the Reed-Solomon code
used to encode the control information into these blocks. This recovers the permutation used to
scramble the symbols of the concatenated codeword. The decoder can then unscramble the symbols
in the message blocks and run the standard algorithm for the concatenated code to recover the
message.
One pitfall in the above approach is that message blocks could potentially get mistaken for
corrupted control blocks and get decoded as erroneous control information that leads the whole
algorithm astray. To prevent this, in addition to scrambling the symbols of the message blocks
by a (pseudo)random permutation, we also add a pseudorandom offset (which is nearly t-wise
independent for some t much larger than the length of the blocks). This will ensure that with
high probability each message block will be very far from every codeword and therefore will not be
mistaken for a control block.
An important issue we have glossed over is that a uniformly random permutation of the n
bits of the payload codeword would take Ω(n log n) bits to specify. This would make the control
information too big compared to the message length; we need it to be a tiny fraction of the
message length. We therefore use almost t-wise independent permutations for t ≈ εn/ log n. Such
permutations can be sampled with ≈ εn random bits. We then make use of the fact that CBSC
enables reliable decoding even when the error locations have such limited independence instead of
being a uniformly random subset of all possible locations [35].
Extending the Construction to log-space and poly-time channels. The construction for
additive channels does not work against more powerful channels for (at least) two reasons:
(i) A more powerful channel may inject a large number of correctly formatted control blocks
into the transmitted word (recall, each of the blocks is quite small). Even if the real control
blocks are uncorrupted, the decoder will have trouble determining which of the correct-looking
control blocks is in fact legitimate.
(ii) Since the channel can decide the errors after seeing parts of the codeword, it may be able to
learn which blocks of the codeword contain the control information and concentrate errors
on those blocks. Similarly, we have to ensure that the channel does not learn about the
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permutation used to scramble the payload codeword and thus cause a bad error pattern that
cannot be decoded by the standard decoder for the concatenated code.
The first obstacle is the easier one to get around, and we do so by using list-decoding: although
the channel may inject spurious possibilities for the control information, the total number of such
spurious candidates will be bounded. This ensures that after list decoding, provided at least a
small fraction of the true control blocks do not incur too many errors, the list of candidates will
include the correct control information with high probability.
To overcome the second obstacle, we make sure, using appropriate pseudorandom generators
and employing a “hybrid” argument, that the encoding of the message is indistinguishable from a
random string by a channel limited to a given time bound T, even when the channel has knowledge
of the message and certain parts of the control information. One then uses this to ensure that the
distribution of errors caused by a time-T channel on the codeword is indistinguishable in polynomial
time from the distribution caused by the same channel on a uniformly random string. The latter
distribution is independent of the codeword. If these error distributions were in fact statistically
close (and not just close w.r.t. time-T tests), successful decoding under oblivious errors would
also imply successful decoding under the error distribution caused by the time bounded channel.
To show that closeness w.r.t. time-T tests does indeed suffice, we need to consider each of the
conditions for correct decoding separately.
The condition that enough control blocks have at most a fraction p+ ε of errors can be checked
in polynomial time given nonuniform advice, namely the locations of the control blocks. We use
this together with the above indistinguishability to prove that enough control blocks are correctly
list-decoded, and thus the correct control information is among the candidates obtained by list
decoding the control code.
The next step is to show that the payload codeword is correctly decoded given knowledge of the
correct control information. The idea is that there is a set of error patterns such that: 1. membership
in the set can be checked in linear time, 2. the set has high probability under any oblivious error
distribution, and 3. any error pattern in the set is correctly decoded with high probability by the
concatenated code. Given these properties, one can show that if the concatenated code errs with
noticeable probability on the actual error distribution, one can build a low-complexity distinguisher
for the error distributions, thus contradicting their computational indistinguishability.
Remark 2. An earlier version of this paper had a more complicated argument for online logspace
channels, replacing one of the random components of the construction with Nisan’s explicit pseudo-
random generator for logspace. Nisan’s generator only ensures that the error distribution caused by
the channel is indistinguishable from oblivious errors by online space-bounded machines. Therefore,
in the above argument, in order to arrive at a contradiction we need to build a distinguisher than
runs in online logspace. However, the unscrambling of the error vector (according to the permu-
tation that was applied to the payload codeword) cannot be done in an online fashion. So we had
to resort to an indirect argument based on showing limited independence of certain events related
to the payload decoding. As pointed out by a reviewer, since the final construction is anyway ran-
domized, in the current version we simply use a random construction of pseudorandom generators
for polynomial size circuits to build codes resilient to polynomial time bounded channels (and hence
also logspace channels).
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6 Explicit Codes of Optimal Rate for Additive Errors
This section describes our construction of codes for additive errors.
6.1 Ingredients
Our construction uses a number of tools from coding theory and pseudorandomness. These are
described in detail in Appendix A. Briefly, we use:
• A constant-rate explicit stochastic code SC : {0, 1}b×{0, 1}b → {0, 1}cob, defined on blocks of
length c0b = Θ(logN), that is efficiently decodable with probability 1− c1/N from a fraction
p + O(ε) of additive errors. decodable with probability 1 − c1/N . These codes are obtained
via Theorem 3.1 (see Proposition A.1 in the appendix) .
• A rate O(ε) Reed-Solomon code RS which encodes a message as the evaluation of a polynomial
at points α1, ..., α` in such a way that an efficient algorithm RS-Decode can efficiently recover
the message given at most ε`/4 correct symbols and at most ε/24 incorrect ones.
• A randomness-efficient sampler Samp : {0, 1}σ → [N ]` , such that for any subset B ⊆ [N ] of
size at least µN , the output set of the sampler intersects with B in roughly a µ fraction of
its size, that is |Samp(s) ∩ B| ≈ µ|Samp(s)|, with high probability over s ∈ {0, 1}σ . We use
an expander-based construction from Vadhan [37].
• A generator KNR : {0, 1}σ → Sn for an (almost) t-wise independent family of permutations
of the set {1, ..., n}, that uses a seed of σ = O(t log n) random bits (Kaplan, Naor, and
Reingold [24]).
• A generator POLYt : {0, 1}σ → {0, 1}n for a t-wise independent distribution of bit strings of
length n, that uses a seed of σ = O(t log n) random bits.
• An explicit efficiently decodable, rate R = 1 − H(p) − O(ε) code REC : {0, 1}Rn → {0, 1}n
that can correct a p fraction of t-wise independent errors, that is: for every message m ∈
{0, 1}Rn, and every error vector e ∈ {0, 1}n of Hamming weight at most pn, we have
REC-Decode(REC(m) + pi(e)) = m with probability at least 1− 2−Ω(ε2t) over the choice of
a permutation pi ∈R range(KNR). (Here pi(e) denotes the permuted vector: pi(e)i = epi(i).) A
standard family of concatenated codes satisfies this property (see, e.g., [35]).
6.2 Analysis
The following (Theorem 3.2, restated) is our result on explicit construction of capacity-achieving
codes for additive errors.
Theorem 6.1. For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), and every ε > 0, the functions Encode, Decode (Al-
gorithms 1 and 2) form an explicit, efficiently encodable and decodable stochastic code with rate
R = 1 − H(p) − ε such that for every m ∈ {0, 1}RN and error vector e ∈ {0, 1}N of Hamming
weight at most pN , we have Prω
[
Decode(Encode(m;ω)+e) = m
]
> 1−exp(−Ω(ε2N/ log2N))),
where N is the block length of the code.
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With all the ingredients described in Section A in place, we can describe and analyze the code
of Theorem 6.1. The encoding algorithm is given in Algorithm 1 (page 17). The corresponding
decoder is given in Algorithm 2 (page 18). Also, a schematic illustration of the encoding is in
Figure 1. The reader might find it useful to keep in mind the high level description from Section 5
when reading the formal description.
Starting the Proof of Theorem 6.1. First, note that the rate R of the overall code approaches
the Shannon bound: R is almost equal to the rate R′ of the code REC used to encode the actual
message bits m, since the encoded control information has length O(εN). The code REC needs to
correct a fraction p+ 25Λε of t-wise independent errors, so we can pick R′ > 1−H(p)−O(ε). Now
the rate R = R
′N ′
N = R
′(1− 24Λε) > 1−H(p)−O(ε) (for small enough ε > 0).
We now turn to the analysis of the decoder. Fix a message m ∈ {0, 1}R·N and an error vector
e ∈ {0, 1}N with Hamming weight at most pN . Suppose that we run Enc on m and coins ω
chosen independently of the pair m, e, and let x = Enc(m;ω) + e. The decoder parses x into blocks
x1, ..., xn′+` of length Λ logN , corresponding to the blocks output by the encoder.
The four lemmas below, proved in Section 6.3, show that the decoder recovers the control
information correctly with high probability. We then show that the payload message is correctly
recovered. The proof of the theorem is completed in Section 6.4.
The lemmas illuminate the roles of the main pseudorandom objects in the construction. First,
the sampler seed is used to ensure that errors are not concentrated on the control blocks, as captured
in the next lemma:
Definition 6.2 (Good sampler seeds). A sampled set V is good for error vector e if the fraction
of control blocks with relative error rate at most p+ ε is at least ε2 . 2
Lemma 6.3 (Good sampler lemma). For any error vector e of relative weight at most p, with
probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(ε3N/ logN) over the choice of sampler seed sV , the set V is good
for e.
Given a good sampler seed, the properties of the stochastic code SC guarantee that many control
blocks are correctly interpreted. Specifically:
Lemma 6.4 (Control blocks lemma). For all e, V such that V is good for e, with probability at
least 1−exp(−Ω(ε3N/ logN)) over the random coins (r1, r2, . . . , r`) used by the ` SC encodings, we
have: (i) The number of control blocks correctly decoded by SC-Decode is at least ε`4 , and (ii) The
number of erroneously decoded control blocks is less than ε`24 .
(By erroneously decoded, we mean that SC-Decode outputs neither ⊥ nor the correct message.)
The offset ∆ is then used to ensure that payload blocks are not mistaken for control blocks:
Lemma 6.5 (Payload blocks lemma). For all m, e, sV , spi, with probability at least 1−2−Ω(ε2N/ log2N))
over the offset seed s∆, the number of payload blocks incorrectly accepted as control blocks by
SC-Decode is less than ε`24 .
The two previous lemmas imply that the Reed-Solomon decoder will, with high probability, be
able to recover the control information. Specifically:
Lemma 6.6 (Control Information Lemma). For any m and e, with probability 1− 2−Ω(ε2N/ log2N)
over the choice of the control information and the coins of SC, the control information is correctly
recovered, that is (s˜V , s˜∆, s˜pi) = (sV , s∆, spi).
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Algorithm 1. Encode: On input parameters N, p, ε (with p + ε < 1/2), and message m ∈ {0, 1}R·N ,
where R = 1−H(p)−O(ε).
1: Λ← 2c0  Here c0 is the expansion of the stochastic code from Theorem 3.1 that can
correct a fraction p+ ε of errors.
n← NΛ logN  The final codeword consists of n blocks of length Λ logN .
`← 24εN/ logN  The control codeword is ` blocks long.
n′ ← n− ` and N ′ ← n′ · (Λ logN)  The payload codeword is n′ blocks long (i.e. N ′ bits).
Phase 1: Generate control information
2: Select seeds spi, s∆, sV uniformly in {0, 1}ε2N .
3: ω ← (spi, s∆, sV )  Total length |ω| = 3ε2N .
Phase 2: Encode control information
4: Encode ω with a Reed-Solomon code RS to get symbols (a1, ..., a`).
 RS is a rate ε
8
Reed-Solomon code of length 24εN = 8
ε
· |ω| bits which evaluates polynomials at
points (α1, . . . , α`) in a field F of size ≈ N .
5: Encode each symbol together with its evaluation point: For i = 1, ..., `, do
• Ai ← (αi, ai)
 We add location information to each RS symbol to handle insertions and
deletions.
• Ci ← SC(Ai, ri), where ri is random of length 2 logN bits.
 SC = SC2 logN,p+ε : {0, 1}2 logN×{0, 1}2 logN → {0, 1}Λ logN is a stochastic
code that can correct a fraction (p+ ε) of additive errors with probability
1− c1/N2 > 1− 1/N as per Proposition A.1.
Phase 3: Generate the payload codeword
6: Encode m using a code that corrects random errors:
• P ← REC(m),  REC : {0, 1}R′N′ → {0, 1}N′ is a code that corrects a p+ 25Λε fraction of
t-wise independent errors, as per Proposition A.9 . Here R′ = RN
N′ .
7: Expand the seeds sV , s∆, spi to get a set V = Samp(sV ), offset ∆ = POLY(s∆), and permutation
pi = KNR(spi).
8: Scramble the payload codeword:
• pi−1(P )← (bits of P permuted according to pi−1)
• Q← pi−1(P )⊕∆
• Cut Q into n′ blocks B1, ...Bn′ of length Λ logN bits.
Phase 4: Interleave blocks of payload codeword and control codeword
9: Interleave control blocks C1, ..., C` with payload blocks B1, ..., Bn′ , using control blocks in positions
from V and payload blocks in remaining positions.
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Algorithm 2. Decode: On input x of length N :
1: Cut x into n′ + ` blocks x1, ..., xn′+` of length Λ log(n) each.
2: Attempt to decode control blocks: For i = 1, ..., n′ + `, do
• F˜i ← SC-Decode(xi).
 With high prob, non-control blocks are rejected (Lemma 6.5), and control
blocks are either correctly decoded or discarded (Lemma 6.4).
• If F˜i 6=⊥, then parse F˜i as (α˜i, a˜i), where α˜i, a˜i ∈ F.
3: (s˜V , s˜∆, s˜pi)← RS-Decode
(
pairs (α˜i, a˜i) output above
)
.
 Control information is recovered w.h.p. (Lemma 6.6).
4: Expand the seeds s˜V , s˜∆, s˜pi to get set V˜ , offset ∆˜, and permutation p˜i.
5: Q˜← concatenation of blocks xi not in V˜
 Fraction of errors in Q˜ is at most p+O(ε).
6: P˜ ← pi(Q˜⊕ ∆˜)  If control info is correct, then errors in P˜ are almost t-wise independent.
7: m˜← REC-Decode(P˜ )
 Run the decoder from Proposition A.9.
Remark 3. It would be interesting to achieve an error probability of 2−Ωε(N), i.e., a positive “error
exponent,” in Theorem 6.1 instead of the 2−Ωε(N/ log
2 N) bound we get. A more careful analysis
(perhaps one that works with almost t′-wise independent offset ∆) can probably improve our error
probability to 2−Ωε(N/ logN), but going further using our approach seems difficult. The existential
result due to Csisza´r and Narayan [7] achieves a positive error exponent for all rates less than
capacity, as does our existence proof using list decoding in Section 4.3.
Remark 4. A slight modification of our construction give codes for the “average error criterion,”
in which the code is deterministic but the message is assumed to be unknown to the channel and the
goal is to ensure that for every error vector most messages are correctly decoded; see Theorem B.5
in Appendix B.
6.3 Proofs of Lemmas used in Theorem 6.1
of Lemma 6.3. Let B ⊂ [n] = [n′+ `] be the set of blocks that contain a (p+ ε) or smaller fraction
of errors. We first prove that B must occupy at least an ε fraction of total number of blocks: to see
why, let γ be the proportion of blocks which have error rate at most (p+ ε). The total fraction of
errors in x is then at least (1− γ)(p+ ε). Since this fraction is at most p by assumption, we must
have 1− γ 6 p/(p+ ε). So γ > ε/(p+ ε) > ε.
Next, we show that the number of control blocks that have error rate at most p+ε cannot be too
small. The error e is fixed before the encoding algorithm is run, and so the sampler seed sV is chosen
independently of the set B. Thus, the fraction of control blocks in B will be roughly ε. Specifically,
we can apply Proposition A.4 with µ = ε (since B occupies at least an ε fraction of the set of blocks),
θ = ε/2 and σ = ε2N . We get that the error probability γ is exp(−Ω(θ2`)) = exp(−Ω(ε3N/ logN).
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(Note that for constant ε, the seed length σ = ε2N  logN + ` log(1/ε) is large enough for the
proposition to apply.)
of Lemma 6.4. Fix e and the sampled set V which is good for e. Consider a particular received
block xi that corresponds to control block j, that is, xi = Cj + ei. The key observation is that the
error vector ei depends on e and the sampler seed V , but it is independent of the randomness used
by SC to generate Cj . Given this observation, we can apply Proposition A.1 directly:
(a) If block i has error rate at most p+ ε, then SC-Decode decodes correctly with probability
at least 1− c1/N2 > 1− 1/N over the coins of SC.
(b) If block i has error rate more than p + ε, then SC-Decode outputs ⊥ with probability at
least 1− c1/N2 > 1− 1/N over the coins of SC.
Note that in both statements (a) and (b), the probability need only be taken over the coins of
SC.
Consider Y, the the number of control blocks that either (i) have “low” error rate (6 p+ ε) yet
are not correctly decoded, or (ii) have high error rate, and are not decoded as ⊥. Because statements
(a) and (b) above depend only on the coins of SC, and these coins are chosen independently in
each block, the variable Y is statistically dominated by a sum of independent Bernoulli variables
with probability 1/N of being 1. Thus E[Y] 6 `/N < 1. By a standard additive Chernoff bound,
the probability that Y exceeds ε`/24 is at most exp(−Ω(ε2`)). The bound on Y implies both the
bounds in the lemma.
of Lemma 6.5. Consider a block xi that corresponds to payload block j, that is, xi = Bj + ei. Fix
e, sV , and spi. The offset ∆ is independent of these, and so we may write xi = yi + ∆i, where
yi is fixed independently of ∆i. Since ∆ is a t
′-wise independent string with t′ = Ω(ε2N/ logN)
much greater than the size Λ logN of each block, the string ∆i is uniformly random in {0, 1}Λ logN .
Hence, so is xi. By Proposition A.1 we know that on input a random string, SC-Decode outputs
⊥ with probability at least 1− c1/N2 > 1− 1/N
Moreover, the t′-wise independence of the bits of ∆ implies t
′
Λ logN -wise independence of the
blocks of ∆. Define t′blocks = min{ t
′
Λ logN ,
ε`
96}. Note that Ω
(
ε2N
log2 N
)
6 t′blocks 6 ε`96 . The decisions
made by SC-Decode on payload blocks are t′blocks-wise independent. Let Z denote the number of
payload blocks that are incorrectly accepted as control blocks by SC-Decode. We have E[Z] 6
n′
N 6 ε`/48 (for large enough N).
We can apply a concentration bound of Bellare and Rompel [4, Lemma 2.3] using t = t′blocks,
µ = E[Z] 6 ε`48 , A =
ε`
48 , to obtain the bound
Pr[Z > ε`24 ] 6 8
(
t′blocks · µ+ (t′blocks)2
(ε`/48)2
)t′blocks/2
6 (logN)−Ω(t′blocks) 6 e−Ω(ε2N log logN/ log2N) .
This bound implies the lemma statement.
of Lemma 6.6. Suppose the events of Lemmas 6.4 and 6.5 occur, that is, for at least ε`/4 of the
control blocks the recovered value F˜i is correct, at most ε`/24 of the control blocks are erroneously
decoded, and at most ε`/24 of the payload blocks are mistaken for control blocks.
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Because the blocks of the control information come with the (possibly incorrect) evaluation
points α˜i, we are effectively given a codeword in the Reed-Solomon code defined for the related
point set {α˜i}. Now, the degree of the polynomial used for the original RS encoding is d∗ =
|ω|/ log(N) − 1 < 3ε2N/ logN = ε`/8. Of the pairs (α˜i, a˜i) decoded by SC-Decode, we know at
least ε`4 are correct (these pairs will be distinct), and at most 2 · ε`24 are incorrect (some of these pairs
may occur more than once, or even collide with one of the correct). If we eliminate any duplicate
pairs and then run the decoding algorithm from Proposition A.2, the control information ω will be
correctly recovered as long as the number of correct symbols exceeds the number of wrong symbols
by at least d∗ + 1. This requirement is met if ε`4 − 2 × ε`24 > d∗ + 1. This is indeed the case since
d∗ < ε`/8.
Taking a union bound over the events of Lemmas 6.4 and 6.5, we get that the probability that
the control information is correctly decoded is at least 1− exp(−Ω(ε2N/ log2N)), as desired.
6.4 Completing the Proof of Main Theorem 6.1
of Theorem 6.1. We will first prove that the decoding of the payload codeword succeeds assuming
the correct control information ω = (spi, s∆, sV ) is handed directly to the decoder, i.e., in the
“shared randomness” setting. We will then account for the fact that we must condition on the
correct recovery of the control information ω by the first stage of the decoder.
Fix a message m, error vector e, and sampler seed sV , and let eQ be the restriction of e to the
payload codeword, i.e., blocks not in V . The relative weight of eQ is at most
pN
N ′ = p
N ′+`Λ logN
N ′ =
p(1 + 24εΛ NN ′ ) 6 p(1 + 25Λε) (for sufficiently small ε).
Now since spi is selected independently from V , the permutation pi is independent of the payload
error eQ. Consider the string P˜ that is input the the REC decoder. We can write P˜ = p˜i(Q˜⊕ ∆˜) =
pi(Q⊕ eQ ⊕∆). Because a permutation of the bit positions is a linear permutation of ZN ′2 , we get
P˜ = pi(Q+ ∆)⊕ pi(eQ) = P ⊕ pi(eQ).
Thus the input to REC is corrupted by a fraction of at most p(1 + 25Λε) errors which are
t-wise independent, in the sense of Proposition A.9 [35]. With probability at least 1 − e−Ω(ε2t) =
1− e−Ω(ε4N/ logN), the message m is correctly recovered by Decode.
In the actual decoding, the control information is not handed directly to the decoder. Let ω˜
be the candidate control information recovered by the decoder (in Step 8 of the algorithm). The
above suite of lemmas (Lemmas 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6) show that the control information is correctly
recovered, i.e., ω˜ = ω, with probability at least exp(−Ω(ε2N/ log2N))).
The overall probability of success is given by
Pr
ω
[payload decoding succeeds with control information ω˜]
which is at least
Pr
ω
[ω˜ = ω ∧ payload decoding succeeds with control information ω˜]
= Pr
ω
[ω˜ = ω ∧ payload decoding succeeds with control information ω]
> 1− Pr
ω
[ω˜ 6= ω]− Pr
ω
[payload decoding succeeds given ω]
> 1− exp(−Ω(ε2N/ log2N))− exp(−Ω(ε4N/ logN)) .
Because ε is a constant relative to logN , it is the former probability that dominates. This completes
the analysis of the decoder and the proof of Theorem 6.1.
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7 Capacity-achieving codes for time-bounded channels
In this section, we outline a Monte Carlo algorithm that, for any desired error fraction p ∈ (0, 1/2),
produces a code of rate close to 1 −H(p) which can be efficiently list decoded from errors caused
by an arbitrary randomized polynomial-time channel that corrupts at most a fraction p of symbols
with high probability. Recall that for p > 1/4, resorting to list decoding is necessary even for very
simple (constant space) channels.
We will use the same high level approach from our construction for the additive errors case,
with some components changed. The main difference is that the codeword will be pseudorandom
to bounded distinguishers, allowing us to “reduce” to the case of oblivious errors. (In fact, we will
show that the errors are indistinguishable from oblivious errors, which will turn out to suffice). We
will make repeated use of the following definition:
Definition 7.1 (Indistinguishability). For a given (possibly randomized) Boolean function A on
some domain D and two random variables X,Y taking values in D, we write X
η≈A Y if
|Pr(A(X) = 1)− Pr(A(Y ) = 1)| 6 η .
We write X
η≈time T Y to indicate that X
η≈A Y for all circuits of size at most T.
Definition 7.2 (Pseudorandom generators). A map G : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}n is said to be (T, ε)-
pseudorandom if
G(Us)
ε≈time T Ub
where Um denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m.
We begin the section with an overview of the code construction. We then develop several key
technical results: a construction of small “pseudorandom codes”, a useful intermediate result, the
Hiding Lemma, and finally we show how to use these to analyze the decoder’s performance.
7.1 Code construction and ingredients
Parameters. Input parameters of the construction: N, p, S, ε, where
1. N is the block length of the final code,
2. pN is the bound on the number of errors introduced (0 < p < 1/2) by the channel w.h.p.
3. T0 is a bound on the circuit size (think “running time”) of the channel. We will eventually
set T0 = N
c for a constant c > 1, though most results hold for any T0 > N .
4. ε is a measure of how far the rate is from the optimal bound of 1 −H(p) (that is, the rate
must be at least 1−H(p)− ε). We will assume 0 < 2ε < 1/2− p.
The seeds/control information. The control information ω consists of three randomly chosen
strings spi, sV , sΓ where spi, sV are as in the additive errors case. We take the lengths of spi, sV be
ζN where ζ = ζ(p, ε) will be chosen small enough compared to ε.
The third string sΓ ∈ {0, 1}γN is the seed of a pseudorandom generator Gen that outputs N
bits and fools circuits of size (roughly) T0. (A shorter seed would suffice here, but we make all
seeds the same length for simplicity – see below.) The offset Γ← Gen(sΓ) will be used to fool the
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polynomial-time channel. We do not need to add the t′-wise independent offset ∆ as we did in the
additive errors case.
Encoding the message. The payload codeword encoding the messagem will be pi−1(REC(m))⊕Γ,
which is the same as the encoding for the additive channel, with the offset Γ added to break
dependencies in the time-bounded channel instead of the t′-wise independent offset ∆.
The code REC is the same as the code for the case of additive errors. We will denote by βREC
the maximum, over fixed error patterns e, of the probability, over permutations pi, that REC does
not correctly decode the pattern pi(e). As noted in Section 6.1, βREC 6 2−Ω(ε
2ζN/ logN). We will
need the following additional property of REC: there is a circuit of size Oε(N) that takes as input
an error pattern e, permutation pi and set of control positions V , and checks whether or not REC
will decode the error pattern pi(e) (restricted to positions outside of V ) correctly. (This circuit
works by counting the number of blocks of the concatenated code which the inner code decodes
incorrectly.)
For the offset Γ, we need a pseudorandom generator PolyPRG that is computable in time poly(N)
and secure against circuits of size T with polynomially small error, with seed length at most γN .
Such generators can be constructed in a Monte Carlo fashion (a random function from c logN to
N bits will do, for a large enough constant c):
Proposition 7.3 (Folklore (also follows from Proposition 7.4)). For every constant ζ > 0 and
polynomial T(N) > N , for sufficiently large N there exists a poly-time Monte Carlo construction
of a polynomial-time computable function PolyPRG from ζN to N bits that is (T, 1T) pseudorandom
with probability at least 1− 1/T.
This construction can be made explicit assuming either that one-way functions exist [39, 20], or
that E 6⊆ SIZE(2ε0n) for some absolute constant ε0 > 0 [23] (where E = TIME(2O(n)) and SIZE(2ε0n)
denotes the class of languages that have size O(2ε0n) circuits). For space-bounded (as opposed to
time-bounded) distinguishers, there is even an explicit construction that makes no assumptions [31].
However, as noted by one reviewer, we require a Monte Carlo algorithm to construct pseudorandom
codes (as required by Proposition 7.4 below), even for space-bounded channels. Therefore, we use a
Monte Carlo construction of PolyPRG and get a single statement covering time- and space-bounded
channels.
Encoding the seeds. The control information (consisting of the seeds spi, sV , sΓ) will be encoded
by a similar structure to the solution for the additive channel: a Reed-Solomon code of rate RRS =
RRS(p, ε) concatenated with an inner stochastic code. But the stochastic code SC (of Proposition
A.1) will now be replaced by a pseudorandom code PRC which satisfies two requirements: first, it
has good list decoding properties and, second, the (stochastic) encoding of any given message is
indistinguishable from a random string by a randomized time-bounded channel. The construction
of the necessary stochastic code is guaranteed by the following lemma.
Proposition 7.4 (Inner control codes exist). For some fixed positive integer Λ0 the following
holds. For all δ, 0 < δ < 1/2 and polynomials T = T(N) > N , for sufficiently large N there exist
R = R(δ) > (1/2 − δ)Ω(1) > 0 and a positive integer L = L(δ) 6 1/(1/2 − δ)O(1) such that there
exists a poly(T) time randomized Monte Carlo algorithm that outputs a stochastic code with block
length b = Λ0 log(T) and rate k/b > R that is
• (δ, L)-list decodable: for every y ∈ {0, 1}b, there are at most L pairs (m, r) such that E(m, r)
is within Hamming distance δb of y;
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• (T, 1/T)-pseudorandom: For every m ∈ {0, 1}k, we have E(m,Us)
1/T≈ time T Ub.
Further, there exists a deterministic decoding procedure running in time poly(T) that, given a
string y ∈ {0, 1}b, recovers the complete list of at most L pairs (m, r) whose encodings E(m, r) are
within Hamming distance at most δb from y.
Proposition 7.4 is proved in Section 7.3. An interesting direction for future work is the design
of explicit pseudorandom stochastic codes along the lines of Proposition 7.4. See Section 8.
Full Code. To construct the final code, we will apply the Monte Carlo constructions of the previous
section with time T2 = T0 + O(N max{logN, 2poly(1/ε)}) (the exact value of T2 will be clear from
the analysis). For constant ε, it suffices to take T2 = 2T0 when T0is a large enough polynomial in
N . This means the control blocks have length Λ0 log T2 = Θ(log T0). The control blocks occupy an
ε fraction of the whole codeword, which means the number of real control blocks is nctrl = Θ(
εN
log T0
).
As in the additive errors case, the control blocks will be interspersed with the payload blocks
at locations specified by the sampler’s output on sV .
Rate of the code. The code encoding the control information is of some small constant rate
Rctrl(p, ε), but the control information consists only of O(ζN) bits. Given ε, we can select ζ small
enough so that the control portion of the codeword only adds εN/2 bits to the overall encoding.
The rate of REC is at least (1− ε/10)(1−H(p)− ε/10) > 1−H(p)− ε/5. So the rate of the overall
stochastic code is at least 1−H(p)− ε as desired.
7.2 List decoding algorithm for full encoding
The decoding algorithm for the full encoding will be similar to the additive case with the principal
difference being that the inner stochastic codes will be decoded using the procedure guaranteed in
Proposition 7.4. For each block, we obtain a list of L possible pairs of the form (αi, ai). This set
of (at most NL) pairs is the fed into the polynomial time Reed-Solomon list decoding algorithm
(guaranteed by Proposition A.3), which returns a list of poly(1/ε) values for the control information.
This comprises the first phase of the decoder.
Once a list of control vectors is recovered, the second phase of the decoder will run the decoding
algorithm for REC for each of these choices of the control information and recover a list of possible
messages.
The steps to decode each of inner stochastic codes takes time poly(T) and decoding the Reed-
Solomon code as well as REC takes time polynomial in N . So the overall run time is polynomial in
N and T.
Theorem 7.5. Let WT0 be an arbitrary randomized time-T0 channel on N input bits that is pN -
bounded. Consider the code construction described in Section 7.1.
The resulting code has rate at least 1 −H(p) − ε. For every message m, with high probability
over the choice of control information spi, sV , sΓ, the coins of PRC and the coins of WT0, the list
output by the decoding algorithm has size poly(1/ε) and includes the message m with probability at
least
1−O(N/T0) .
The running time of the decoding algorithm is polynomial in N and T0.
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The novelty compared to the additive errors case is in the analysis of the decoder, which is more
subtle since we have to deal with a much more powerful channel. The remainder of this section
deals with this analysis, which will establish the validity of Theorem 7.5.
7.3 Monte Carlo Constructions of Pseudorandom Codes
of Proposition 7.4. The codes we design have a specific structure: A binary stochastic code with
encoding map E where E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}b is said to be decomposable if there exist
functions E1 : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}b and E2 : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}b such that E(x, y) = E1(x) ⊕ E2(y) for
every x, y. We say that such a encoding decomposes as E = [E1, E2].
The existence will be shown by a probabilistic construction with a decomposable encoding
E(m, r) = C(m)⊕ BPPRG(r) where C will be (the encoding map of) a linear list-decodable code,
and BPPRG will be a generator that fools size T circuits, obtained by picking BPPRG(r) ∈ {0, 1}b
independently and uniformly at random for each seed r. Here b = Λ0 log(T) for a large enough
absolute constant Λ0 as in the statement of the Proposition. Note that the construction time is
2O(b) = poly(T).
List-decoding property. We adapt the proof that a truly random set is list-decodable. Let
C ⊆ {0, 1}b be a linear (δ, LC = LC(δ))-list decodable code; such codes exist for rates less than
1−H(δ) [17], and can be constructed explicitly with positive rate R(δ) > (1/2− δ)Ω(1) > 0 for any
constant δ < 1/2 with a list size LC 6 1/(1/2− δ)O(1) [18]. We will show that the composed code
E has constant list-size with high probability over the choice of BPPRG as long as the rate of the
combined code is strictly less than 1−H(δ).
Fix a ball B′ of radius δb in {0, 1}b, and let X denote the size of the intersection of the
image of E with B′. We can view the image of E as a union of 2s sub-codes Cr, where Cr is
the translated code C ⊕ BPPRG(r) (for r ∈ {0, 1}s). Each sub-code Cr is (δ, LC)-list-decodable
since it is a translation of C. We can then write X =
∑
r∈{0,1}s Xr, where Xr is the size of
Cr∩B′. The Xr are independent integer-valued random variables with range [0, LC ] and expectation
E[Xr] = |C| · |B′|/2b 6 2−b(1−H(δ)−RC) where RC denotes the rate of C.
If we set s = 10 log T0, we get:
E[X] = 210 log(T)2−b(1−H(δ)−RC) = 2−b(1−H(δ)−RC−10/Λ0) .
Suppose RC + 10/Λ0 = 1−H(δ)−α0, so that E[X] = 2−α0b. Let t be the ratio L/E[X], where
L = L(δ) is the desired list-decoding bound for the composed code E. We will set L = 3LC/α0. By
the multiplicative Chernoff bound for bounded random variables, the probability (over the choice
of BPPRG) that X > L is at most
(
t
e
)tE[X]/LC . Simplifying, we get Pr[X > L] 6 (Le )22−3b 6 2−2b.
Taking a union bound over all 2b possible balls B′, we get that with probability at least 1−2−2b,
the random choice of BPPRG satisfies the property that the decomposable stochastic code with
encoding map E = C ⊕ BPPRG is (δ, L)-list-decodable.
Pseudorandomness. The proof of pseudorandomness is standard, but we include it here for
completeness. It suffices to prove the pseudorandomness property against all deterministic circuits
of size T, since a randomized circuit is just a distribution over deterministic ones.
Fix an arbitrary codeword C(m). Consider the (multi)set Xm = {C(m) ⊕ BPPRG(r)} as r
varies over {0, 1}s. Each element of this set is chosen uniformly and independently at random
from {0, 1}b. Fix a circuit B of size T. By a standard Chernoff bound, the probability, over the
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choice of Xm, that Prx∈Xm [B(x) = 1] deviates from the probability Pr[B(Ub) = 1] that B accepts
a uniformly random string by more than ζ in absolute value, is at most exp(−Ω(ζ2|Xm|)). For
ζ = 1/T and |Xm| = 2s > T10, this probability is at most exp(−Ω(T 80 )).
The number of circuits of size T is exp(O(T log(T))). By a union bound over all these branching
programs, we conclude that except with probability at most exp(−poly(T)) over the choice of
BPPRG, the following holds for every size-T circuit B: |Prx∈Xm [B(x) = 1] − Pr[B(Ub) = 1]| 6
1/T . Since m was arbitrary, we have proved that the constructed stochastic code is (T, 1/T)-
pseudorandom with probability at least 1− 2−2b.
Decoding. Finally, it remains to justify the claim about the decoding procedure. Given a
string y ∈ {0, 1}b, the decoding algorithm will go over all (m, r) ∈ {0, 1}k × {0, 1}s by brute force,
and check for each whether dist(E(m, r), y) 6 δb. By the list-decoding property, there will be at
most L such pairs (m, r). The decoding complexity is 2O(k+s) = 2O(b).
7.4 Analyzing Decoding: Main Steps
It will be convenient to explicitly name the different sources of error in the construction. The code
ingredients are selected so that each of these terms is at most 1/T0.
βΓ(T) distinguishability of long generator (from uniform) by circuits of size
T
βPRC(T) distinguishability of PRC outputs by circuits of size T
βV max. probability (over choice of sampler set V ) that a fixed error
pattern will not be well-distributed among control blocks
βpi max. probability that any fixed error pattern will cause a decoding
error for code REC after pi
Our analysis requires two main claims.
Lemma 7.6 (Few Control Candidates). The decoder recovers a list of L′ 6 poly(1/ε) candidate
values of the control information. The list includes the correct value ω = (spi, sV , sΓ) of the control
information used at the encoder with probability at least 1− βcontrol, where
βcontrol 6 βV + βΓ(T2) +N · βPRC(T2) 6 (N + 3)/T0
when T2 = T0 +O(N logN).
Lemma 7.7 (Payload decoding succeeds). Given the correct control information (pi, V,Γ), the
decoder recovers the correct message with high probability. Specifically, the probability of successful
decoding is at least 1− βpayload where
βpayload 6 βpi + βΓ(T2) +N · βPRC(T2)) 6 (N + 3)/T0
and T2 = T0 +O(N2
poly(1/ε)) .
Combining these two lemmas, which we prove in the next two sections, we get that except with
probability at most βControl + βpayload 6 βV + βpi + 2βΓ(T2) + 2N · βPRC(T2) 6 2(N + 3)/T0, the
decoder recovers a list of at most L′ 6 poly(1/ε) potential messages, one of which is the correct
original message. This establishes Theorem 7.5.
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7.5 The Hiding Lemma
Given a message m, and pseudorandom outputs pi, V,Γ based on the seeds spi, sV , sΓ, let
Enc(m;pi, V,Γ, r1, ..., rnctrl)
denote the output of the encoding algorithm when the ri’s are used as the random bits for the
LSC encoding. Let Enc(m;pi, V, ·) be a random encoding of the message m using a given pi, V and
selecting all other inputs at random.
Lemma 7.8 (Hiding Lemma). For all messages m, sampler sets V and permutations pi, the random
variable Enc(m;pi, V, ·) is pseudorandom, namely:
Enc(m;pi, V, ·) β≈time T UN ,
where β 6 βHide(T)
def
=6 N · βPRC(T′) + βΓ(T′) and T′ = T +N .
For our purposes, the most important consequence of the Hiding Lemma that even with the
knowledge of m,pi and V , the distribution of errors inflicted by a space-bounded channel on a
codeword of our code and on a uniformly random string are indistinguishable by time-bounded
tests.
In other words, the pseudorandomness of the codewords allows us to reduce the analysis of
time-bounded errors to the additive case, as long as the events whose probability we seek to bound
can be tested for by small circuits. We encapsulate this idea in the “Oblivious Errors Corollary”,
below. The proof of the Hiding Lemma follows that of the corollary.
Definition 7.9 (Error distribution). Given a randomized channel W on N bits and a random
variable D on {0, 1}N , let EW(D) = D ⊕W(D) denote the error introduced by W when D is sent
through the channel.
Corollary 7.10 (Errors are Near-Oblivious). For every m,pi, V and randomized time-T channel
W. The error distributions for a real codeword and a random string are indistinguishable. That is,
for every time bound T′:
EW(UN )
β≈time T′ EW(Enc(m;pi, V, ·))
where β 6 βHide(T + T′ + N) and βHide(·) is the bound from the Hiding Lemma (7.8). Note that
the distinguishing circuits here may depend on m,pi, V .
of Corollary. One can compose a distinguisher for the two error random variables with the channel
W to get a distinguisher for the original distributions of the Hiding Lemma. This composition
requires the addition of a layer of XOR gates (thus adding N to the size of the circuit).
of the Hiding Lemma (Lemma 7.8). The proof proceeds by a standard hybrid argument. Fixm,pi, V ,
and recall that nctrl = |V | < N is the number of control blocks. Let D0 be the random variable
Enc(m;pi, V, ·), and Dnctrl+1 be the uniform distribution over {0, 1}N . We define intermediate ran-
dom variables D1, D2, ..., Dnctrl : In Di, the first i control blocks from D0 are replaced by random
strings. For a given time-T circuit A, let pi = Pr[A(Di) = 1].
Note that for i ∈ {1, ..., nctrl}, Di−1 and Di are distributed identically in all blocks except the ith-
control block. The pseudorandomness of PRC implies that, conditioned on any particular fixed value
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of the positions outside the i-th control block, the distributions Di−1 and Di are indistinguishable
up to error βPRC(T) 6 βPRC(T′) by circuits of size T. Averaging over the possible values of the
other blocks, we get |pi − pi−1| 6 βPRC(T′).
To compare Dnctrl and Dnctrl+1 = UN , note that the two distributions would be identical if the
offset Γ were replaced by a truly random string. Since the control blocks are now random (and
hence carry no information about sΓ), we use a distinguisher for Dnctrl and Dnctrl+1 (of size T) to
get a distinguisher between Γ and UN ′ (of size T
′) by XORing the challenge string with the REC
encoding of the message, permuted according to pi. Because m,pi, V can be fixed, the encoding
can be hardwired into the new distinguisher, leading to a size increase of only N ′ < N XOR gates.
Thus, |pnctrl+1 − pnctrl | 6 βΓ(T′) where T′ = T +N .
Combining these bounds, we get |pnctrl+1 − p0| 6 NβPRC(T′) + βΓ(T′), as desired.
7.6 Control Candidates Analysis
Armed with the Hiding Lemma, we can show that the decoder can recover a small list of candidate
control strings, one of which is correct with high probability (Lemma 7.6).
There were four main lemmas in the analysis of additive errors. The first (Lemma 6.3) stated
that the sampler set V is good error pattern e for V with high probability. A version of this lemma
holds also for time-bounded errors. Recall that V is good for e (Definition 6.2) if at least a fraction
ε of the nctrl control blocks have an error rate (fraction of flipped bits) bounded above by p+ ε.
Lemma 7.11 (Good Samplers: time-bounded analogue to Lemma 6.3). For every pN -bounded
time-T0 channel with T0 > N and for every message m and permutation seed spi, the set V is good
for the error pattern e introduced by the channel with probability at least 1− (βV + 2βΓ(T2) + 2N ·
βPRC(T2)) > 1−2(N + 3)/T0 over the choice of sampler seed sV , the seed sΓ for the pseudorandom
offset, the coins of the control encoding and the coins of the channel. Here T2 = T0 +N logN .
Proof. The crucial observation here is that Oblivious Errors Lemma implies that the error pattern
introduced by a bounded channel is almost independent of V from the point of view of any time-T
test. That is, by a simple averaging argument, the Oblivious Errors Lemma implies that for every
distribution on m,pi, V , we have
(m,pi, V, EW(UN ))
β≈time T′ (m,pi, V, EW(Enc(m;pi, V, ·))) . (1)
The properties of the sampler imply that the probability of getting a good (control set, error)
pair in the left hand distribution is at least 1− βV .
Thus, all we really have to do is show that “goodness” of the control set V can be tested
efficiently, given e and V . Testing for goodness only involves counting the number of errors in each
of the control blocks, and tallying the number of control blocks with too high a fraction of errors.
This can be done in circuit size O(N logN) (in fact, quite a bit less but the optimization doesn’t
matter here).
By the Oblivious Errors lemma, the probability of a good (control set, error) pair on the right-
hand side of (1) is at least 1− βV − βHide(T +O(N logN)), as desired.
We now turn to the second lemma in the analysis of the control information decoding (Lemma
6.4 for additive errors), which stated that when the sampled positions V are good for the error
pattern e, one can correctly recover a large number of control blocks. This is no longer true in our
setting, but we require only the following weaker statement.
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Lemma 7.12 (Correct Control Blocks — list decoding version). For any fixed e and V such that V
is good for e, the decoding algorithm for the inner codes PRC outputs a list of L symbols containing
the correct symbol ai for at least
εnctrl
2 = Θ(
ε2N
logT0
) control blocks.
Proof. The list-decoding radius of the PRC code is set to be δ > p+ ε, so all blocks with an error
rate below p+ ε produce a valid list.
The third lemma from the analysis of additive errors (Lemma 6.5), which previously stated that
very few payload blocks are mistaken for control blocks, requires a significant change, because it is
possible for the time-bounded channel to inject fake control blocks into the codeword (by changing
a block to some pre-determined codeword of PRC). Therefore we can only say that the total number
of candidate control blocks is small.
Lemma 7.13 (Bounding mistaken control blocks). For every m, e, ω, the total number of candidate
control symbols is at most NLbctrl = Θ(
NL
log T0
).
Proof. Since each candidate control block has bctrl = Θ(logT0) bits, there are
N
logT0
blocks con-
sidered by the decoder. The list decoding of each such block yields at most L candidate control
symbols.
of Lemma 7.6. Given Lemmas 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13, we only need to ensure that the rate RRS of
the Reed-Solomon code used at the outer level to encode the control information is small enough
so that list decoding is possible according to Proposition A.3 as long as (1) the number of data
pairs n is at most NLbctrl and (2) the number of agreements t is at least Θ(
ε2N
logT0
). The claimed list
decoding is possible with rate RRS = O(ε4/L), and the list decoder will return at most O(L/ε2)
candidates for the control information. Since the list decoding radius δ of PRC was chosen to be
δ = p + ε < 1/2 − ε, we have L 6 1/εO(1) by the guarantee of Proposition 7.4, so the output list
size is bounded by a polynomial in 1/ε. This proves Lemma 7.6.
7.7 Payload Decoding Analysis
We now show Lemma 7.7: given a magical, correct copy of the control information, the payload
blocks will correctly be decoded to recover the message m. The assumption of correct control
information essentially places us in the shared randomness setting.
As with the analysis of the control block decoding, we use the fact that errors are nearly-
oblivious (Corollary 7.10) to argue that the events that we needed to happen with high probability
for successful decoding against additive errors (where the errors were oblivious to the codeword)
will also happen with good probability with a time-bounded channel.
of Lemma 7.7. Fix the message m and the choice V of the control block locations. Recall that the
probability for an oblivious error distribution that pi(e) causes REC to decode m incorrectly is at
most βpi 6 1/T0.
Note that given a permutation pi, control set V and an error pattern e, one can easily check if
the payload code REC will correctly decode the error pattern (one could run the full decoder for
REC; alternatively, one can simply check that a sufficiently large number of the inner code blocks
are decoded correctly by the inner code). There is a circuit of size O(N2poly(1/ε)) that verifies if
decoding will occur correctly.
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We can thus apply the Oblivious Errors Corollary (7.10) with T = T0 and T
′ = O(N2poly(1/ε))
to show the following: for every fixed m,V , the probability that a time-T0 channel W introduces
errors that induce a decoding mistake (by REC) is at most
βpi + βHide(T2) = βpi + βΓ(T2) +NβPRC(T2) ,
where T2 = T0 +O(N2
poly(1/ε)), as desired.
8 Open Questions
The code constructions of the previous sections leave several open questions:
Uniquely decodable codes beyond the GV bound. The codes we design for time-bounded
channels are list-decodable, but not necessarily uniquely decodable. This is inherent to the current
analysis, since even a very simple adversary may inject valid control blocks into the codeword,
potentially causing the decoder to come up with several seemingly valid control strings. For p > 1/4,
we know the limitation is inherent to any construction, because our lower bound describes an attack
that can be carried out by a very simple attacker. However, for p < 1/4, it may still be possible
to design codes that lead the decoder to a unique, correct codeword with high probability. Since
the initial version of this paper was published, [21] showed that random codes can tolerate causal
errors slightly beyond the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (regardless of the channel’s complexity) in the
low-error regime (i.e., they can achieve a rate better than 1 − H(2p) for correcting a fraction p
of online errors, for small p). Those codes are neither explicit nor decodable in polynomial time,
however.
(More) Explicit Constructions for Time-Bounded Channels. Our design of time-bounded
channels uses Monte Carlo constructions in two places: for the pseudorandom code PRC and the
generator Γ. Constructions for the generator Γ are in fact known based on worst-case hardness
assumptions for circuits (say, that exponential time does not have subexponential size circuits [23]).
An interesting direction for future work is the design of explicit pseudorandom stochastic codes
along the lines of Proposition 7.4 under such hardness assumptions. This would make the entire
code construction explicit (conditionally).
Explicit Constructions for Online Space-Bounded Channels. Similarly to time-bounded
channels, one can define online space-bounded channels. An online space-S channel is a width-2S
branching program that makes a single in-order pass over the transmitted codeword, and outputs
one bit for every bit that is read. Such channels were first considered by Galil et al. [14] and are
special case of both time-bounded channels (since a space-S channel can be implemented by a
time-N · 2S circuit) and of causal channels [9, 27].
Another direction for future work is the construction of fully explicit codes for space-bounded
channels, without hardness assumptions or Monte Carlo constructions. We considered online space-
bounded channels in the initial version of this paper. The analysis of the codes for such channels
was complex, because the reductions needed to preserve logarithmic space. Our original analysis,
however, shows that one only needs to construct logarithmic-length, pseudorandom stochastic codes
for logarithmic-space channels in order to get a full construction (as one can use Nisan’s generator
[31] for Γ). The lemmas required for obtaining the full construction from these pieces can be found
in version 3 of the arxiv version of this paper (http://arxiv.org/abs/1004.4017v3).
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A Ingredients for Code Construction for Additive Errors
In this section, we will describe the various ingredients that we will need in our construction of
capacity achieving AVC codes, expanding on the brief mention of these from Section 6.1.
A.1 Constant rate codes for average error
By plugging in an appropriate explicit construction of list-decodable codes (with sub-optimal rate)
into Theorem 4.5, we can also get the following explicit constructions of stochastic codes, albeit
not at capacity. We will make use of these codes to encode blocks of logarithmic length control
information in our final capacity-achieving explicit construction. The total number of bits in all
these control blocks together will only be a small fraction of the total message length. So the
stochastic codes encoding these blocks can have any constant rate, and this allows us to use any
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off-the-shelf explicit constant rate list-decodable code in Theorem 4.5 (in particular, we do not
need a brute-force search for small list-decodable codes of logarithmic block length). We get the
following claim by choosing d = 1 and picking C to be a binary linear (α, c1(α)/2)-list decodable
code in Theorem 4.5.
Proposition A.1. For every α, 0 < α < 1/2, there exists c0 = c0(α) > 0 and c1 = c1(α) < ∞
such that for all large enough integers b, there is an explicit stochastic code SCk,α of rate 1/c0 with
encoding E : {0, 1}b × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}c0b that is efficiently strongly α-decodable with probability
1− c12−b.
Moreover, for every message and every error pattern of more than a fraction α of errors, the
decoder for SCk,α returns ⊥ and reports a decoding failure with probability 1− c12−b.
Further, there exists an absolute constant c3 = c3(α) such that on input a uniformly random
string y from {0, 1}c0b, the decoder for SCk,α returns ⊥ with probability at least 1− c12−b (over the
choice of y).
Proof. The claim follows by choosing d = 1 and picking C to be a binary linear (α, c1(α)/2)-list
decodable code in Theorem 4.5. The claim about decoding a uniformly random input follows since
the number of strings y which differ from some valid output of the encoder E is at most a fraction
α of positions is at most 22b2H(α)c0b. By standard entropy arguments, we have (1 − H(α))c0b +
log(c1(α)/2) > 3b (since the code encodes 3b bits, the capacity is 1−H(α), and at most log(c1(α)/2)
additional bits of side information are necessary to disambiguate the true message from the list).
We conclude that the probability that a random string gets accepted by the decoder is at most
2−b · 2log(c1(α)/2) 6 c12−b.
A.2 Reed-Solomon codes
If F is a finite field with at least n elements, and S = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) is a sequence of n distinct ele-
ments from F, the Reed-Solomon encoding, RSF,S,n,k(m), or just RS(m) when the other parameters
are implied, of a message m = (m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1) ∈ Fk is given by
RSF,S,n,k(m) = (f(α1), f(α2), · · · , f(αn)) . (2)
where f(X) = m0 + m1X + ... + mk−1Xk−1. The following is a classic result on unique decoding
Reed-Solomon codes [33], stated as a noisy polynomial reconstruction algorithm.
Proposition A.2 (Unique decoding of RS codes). There is an efficient algorithm with running
time polynomial in n and log |F| that given n distinct pairs (αi, ai) ∈ F2, 1 6 i 6 n, and an integer
k < n, finds the unique polynomial f of degree at most k, if any, that satisfies f(αi) = ai for more
than n+k2 values of i. Note that this condition can also be expressed as
∣∣{i : f(αi) = ai}∣∣ − ∣∣{i :
f(αi) 6= ai)}
∣∣ > k.
We also state a list-decoding generalization (the version due to Sudan [36] suffices for our
purposes), which will be used in our result for space-bounded channels.
Proposition A.3 (List decoding of RS codes [36]). There is an efficient algorithm with running
time polynomial in n and log |F| that given n distinct pairs (αi, ai) ∈ F2, 1 6 i 6 n, and integer
k < n, finds the set L of all polynomials f of degree at most k, if any, that satisfy f(αi) = ai for
at least t values of i as long as t >
√
2kn. Moreover, there are at most
√
2n/k polynomials in the
set L.
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A.3 Pseudorandom constructs
A.3.1 Samplers
Let [N ] = {1, 2, . . . , N}. If B ⊆ [N ]→ {0, 1} has density µ (i.e., µN elements), then standard tail
bounds imply that for a random subset V ⊆ [N ] of size `, the density of B ∩ V is within ±θ of
µ with overwhelming probability (at least 1 − exp(−cθ`)). But picking a random subset of size `
requires ≈ ` log(N/`) random bits. The following shows that a similar effect can be achieved by a
sampling procedure that uses fewer random bits. The idea is the well known one of using random
walks of length ` in a low-degree expander on N vertices. This could lead to repeated samples while
we would like ` distinct samples. This can be achieved by picking slightly more than ` samples and
discarding the repeated ones. The result below appears in this form as Lemma 8.2 in [37].
Proposition A.4. For every N ∈ N, 0 < θ < µ < 1, γ > 0, and integer ` > `0 = Ω( 1θ2 log(1/γ)),
there exists an explicit efficiently computable function Samp : {0, 1}σ → [N ]` where σ 6 O(logN +
` log(1/θ)) with the following property:
For every B ⊆ [N ] of size at least µN , with probability at least 1−γ over the choice of a random
s ∈ {0, 1}σ, |Samp(s) ∩B| > (µ− θ)|Samp(s)|.
We will use the above samplers to pick the random positions in which the blocks holding encoded
control information are interspersed with the data blocks. The sampling guarantee will ensure that
a reasonable fraction of the control blocks have no more than a fraction p + ε of errors when the
total fraction of errors is at most p.
A.3.2 Almost t-wise independent permutations
Definition A.5. A distribution D on Sn (the set of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}) is said to almost
t-wise independent if for every 1 6 i1 < i2 < · · · < it 6 n, the distribution of (pi(i1), pi(i2), . . . , pi(it))
for pi chosen according to D has statistical distance at most 2−t for the uniform distribution on t-
tuples of t distinct elements from {1, 2, . . . , n}. 2
A uniformly random permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n} takes log n! = Θ(n log n) bits to describe.
The following result shows that almost t-wise independent permutations can have much shorter
descriptions.
Proposition A.6 ([24]). For all integers 1 6 t 6 n, there exists D = O(t log n) and an explicit
map KNR : {0, 1}σ → Sn, computable in time polynomial in n, such that the distribution KNR(s)
for random s ∈ {0, 1}σ is almost t-wise independent.
A.3.3 t-wise independent bit strings
We will also need small sample spaces of binary strings in {0, 1}n which look uniform for any t
positions.
Definition A.7. A distribution D on {0, 1}n is said to t-wise independent if for every 1 6 i1 <
i2 < · · · < it 6 n, the distribution of (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xit) for x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) chosen according to
D equals the uniform distribution on {0, 1}t. 2
Using evaluations of degree t polynomials over a field of characteristic 2, the following well known
fact can be shown. We remark that the optimal seed length is about t2 log n and was achieved in
[2], but we can work with the weaker O(t log n) seed length.
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Proposition A.8. Let n be a positive integer, and let t 6 n. There exists σ 6 O(t log n) and
an explicit map POLYt : {0, 1}σ → {0, 1}n, computable in time polynomial in n, such that the
distribution POLYt(s) for random s ∈ {0, 1}σ is t-wise independent.
A.4 Capacity achieving codes for t-wise independent errors
Forney [13] constructed binary linear concatenated codes that achieve the capacity of the binary
symmetric channel BSCp. Smith [35] showed that these codes also correct patterns of at most a
fraction p of errors w.h.p. when the error locations are distributed in a t-wise independent manner
for large enough t. The precise result is the following.
Proposition A.9. For every p, 0 < p < 1/2 and every ε > 0, there is an explicit family of binary
linear codes of rate R > 1 −H(p) − ε such that a code REC : {0, 1}Rn → {0, 1}n of block length n
in the family provides the following guarantee. There is a polynomial time decoding algorithm Dec
such that for every message m ∈ {0, 1}Rn, every error vector e ∈ {0, 1}n of Hamming weight at
most pn, and every almost t-wise independent distribution D of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}, we
have
Dec(REC(m) + pi(e)) = m
with probability at least 1−2−Ω(ε2t) over the choice of a permutation pi ∈R D, as long as ω(log n) <
t < εn/10. (Here pi(e) denotes the permuted vector: pi(e)i = epi(i).)
We will use the above codes (which we denote REC, for “random-error code”) to encode the
actual data in our stochastic code construction.
B Capacity-achieving codes for average error
The average error criterion is an extensively studied topic in the literature on arbitrarily varying
channels; see the survey [28] and the many references therein. Here we assume the message is
unknown to the channel and the decoding error probability is taken over a uniformly random
choice of the message and the noise of the channel. The following defines this notion for the special
case of the additive errors. The idea is that we want every error vector to be bad for only a small
fraction of messages.
Definition B.1 (Codes for average error). A code C with encoding function E :M→ Σn is said to
be (efficiently) p-decodable with average error δ if there is a (polynomial time computable) decoding
function D : Σn → M∪ {⊥} such that for every error vector e ∈ Σn, the following holds for at
least a fraction (1− δ) of messages m ∈M: D(E(m) + e) = m. 2
B.1 Codes for average error from stochastic codes for additive errors
A slightly more general notion of stochastic codes (Definition 4.2) implies codes for average error.
Definition B.2 (Strongly decodable stochastic codes). We say a stochastic code is strongly p-
decodable with probability 1− δ if the decoding function correctly computes both the message m and
randomness ω used at the encoder, with probability at least 1− δ. 2
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Using a strongly decodable stochastic code we can get a code for average error by simply using
the last few bits of the message as the randomness of the stochastic encoder. If the number of
random bits used by the stochastic code is small compared to the message length, the rates of the
codes in the two models are almost the same.
Observation B.3. A stochastic code SSC that is strongly p-decodable with probability 1− δ gives a
code AVC of the same block length that is p-decodable with average error δ. If the ratio of number
of random bits to message bits in SSC is λ, the rate of AVC is (1 + λ) times the rate of SSC.
B.2 Explicit capacity-achieving codes for average error
We would now like to apply Observation B.3 to the stochastic codes constructed in Section 6 and
also construct explicit codes achieving capacity for the average error criterion. For this, we need
to ensure that the decoder for the stochastic code can also recover all the random bits used at
the encoding. We already showed (Lemma 6.6) that the random string ω comprising the control
information is in fact correctly recovered w.h.p. However, there is no hope to recover all the random
strings r1, r2, . . . , r` used by the various SC encodings. This is because some of these control blocks
could incur much more than a fraction p+ ε of errors (or in fact be totally corrupted).
Our idea is to use the same random string r for each of the ` encodings SC(Ai, r) in Step 5.
Since each run of SC-Decode is correct with probability at least 1 − c1/N2, by a union bound
over all n blocks, we can claim that all the following events occur with probability at least 1−c1/N
(over the choice of r):
Among the control blocks, all of the at least ε`/2 control blocks with at most a fraction
p+ ε of errors are decoded correctly, along with the random string r, by SC-Decode.
Further, SC-Decode outputs ⊥ on all the other control blocks. Thus the correct
random string r gets at least ε`/2 “votes.”
By Lemma 6.5, with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ε2N/ log2N))) (over the choice of ω), the
number of payload blocks that get accepted as control blocks is at most ε`/24. (Note that this
lemma only used the t′-wise independence of the offset string ∆.)
The above facts imply that the control information ω is recovered correctly with probability at
least 1 − O(1/N) over the choice of (ω, r) (this is the analog of Lemma 6.6). Also r is the unique
string which will get at least ε`/2 votes from the various runs of SC-Decode. Therefore it can be
correctly identified (with probability at least 1 − O(1/N) over the choice of (ω, r)) after running
SC-Decode on all the n blocks. We can thus conclude the following result on capacity-achieving
codes for average error (Definition B.1).
Lemma B.4 (Polynomially small average error). For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), and every ε > 0, there is
an explicit family of binary codes of rate at least 1−H(p)− ε that are efficiently p-decodable with
average error O(1/N) where N is the block length of the code.
One can reduce the error probability in this theorem by using redundant, but t-wise independent,
values ri for the control block encodings. Specifically, let (r1, ..., r`) be a random codeword from a
Reed-Solomon code of dimension ε`/8 (the simpler construction above corresponds to a majority
code). Then the ri values are, in particular, ε`/8-wise independent. One can modify the proof
of Lemma 6.4 (which states that sufficiently many control blocks are recovered) to rely on only
this limited independence. Under the same conditions that the control information is correctly
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recovered, there is enough information to recover the entire vector r1, ..., r`. We can thus prove the
following:
Theorem B.5 (Exponentially small average error). For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), and every ε > 0, there
is an explicit family of binary codes of rate at least 1−H(p)−ε that are efficiently p-decodable with
average error exp(−Ωε(N/ log2N)) where N is the block length of the code.
C Impossibility Results for Bit-Fixing Channels when p > 14
We show that even very simple channels prevent reliable communication if they can introduce
a fraction errors strictly greater than 1/4. In particular, this result (a) separates the additive
(i.e., oblivious) error model from bounded-space channels when p > 1/4, and (b) shows that some
relaxation of correctness is necessary to handle space- and time-bounded channels when p > 1/4.
Theorem C.1 (Impossibility for p > 14 , detailed version). For every pair of randomized encod-
ing/decoding algorithms Enc,Dec that make n uses of the channel and use a message space whose
size tends to infinity with n, if a uniformly random message is sent over the channel, then
1. there is a distribution over memoryless channels that alters at most n/4 bits in expectation
and causes a decoding error with probability at least 12 − o(1).
2. for every 0 < ν < 14 , there is an online space-dlog(n)e channel W2 that alters at most n(14 +ν)
bits (with probability 1) and causes a decoding error with probability Ω(ν).
Our proof adapts the impossibility results of Ahlswede [1] on arbitrarily-varying channels. We
present a self-contained proof for completeness. Readers familiar with the AVCs literature will
recognize the idea of symmetrizability from [1].
The Swapping Channel. We begin by considering a simple swapping channel, whose behavior is
specified by a state vector s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ {0, 1}n. On input a transmitted word c = (c1, ..., cn) ∈
{0, 1}n, the channel Ws outputs ci in all positions where ci = si, and a random bit in all positions
where ci 6= si. The bits selected randomly by the channel at different positions are independent.
There are several equivalent characterizations that help to understand the channel’s behavior.
First, we may view the channel as outputting either ci or si, independently for each position.
Ws(c)i =
{
ci if ci = si
U ← {0, 1} if ci 6= si
=
{
ci with prob. 1/2
si with prob. 1/2
This view of the channel makes it obvious that the output distribution is symmetric with respect
to the inversion of c and s. That is,
Ws(c) and Wc(s)are identically distributed (3)
The key idea behind our lower bounds is that if s is itself a valid codeword, then the decoder
cannot tell whether c was sent with state s, or s was sent with state c. If c and s code different
messages, then the decoder will make a mistake with probability at least 1/2.
Note that the expected number of errors introduced by the channel is half of the Hamming
distance dist(c, s); specifically, the number of errors is distributed as Binomial(dist(c, s), 12). As
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long as dist(c, s) is close to n/2, then the number of errors will be less than n(14 + ν) with high
probability.
Hard Channel Distributions. Given an stochastic encoder Enc(·; ·), consider the following
distribution on swapping channels: pick a random codeword in the image of Enc and use it as the
state.
Wmain(c) :

Select m′, r′ uniformly at random
Compute s← Enc(m′, r′)
Output Ws(c)
Lemma C.2. Under the conditions of Theorem C.1, for channel Wmain:
(a) The probability of a decoding error on a random message is 12 − o(1).
(b) The expected number of bits altered by W(main) is at most n/4.
Proof. (a) We are interested in bounding the probability of a decoding error:
Pr(correct decoding) = Pr
m,r
channel coins
(
Dec(Wmain(Enc(m, r))) = m
)
= Pr
m,r,m′,r′
swapping coins
(
Dec(WEnc(m′,r′)(Enc(m, r))) = m
)
.
Because of the symmetry of the swapping channel, the right hand side is equal to the probability
that the decoder outputs m′, rather than m. This is a decoding error as long as m′ differs from m.
We assumed that the size of the message space grows with n, so the probability that m = m′ goes
to 0 with n. We use “right” and “wrong” and shorthand for the events that decoding is correct
and incorrect, respectively.
Pr(right) = Pr
m,m′
(decoder outputs m′) 6 Pr(wrong ∨m = m′) 6 Pr(wrong) + o(1) .
Thus, the probability of correct decoding is at most 12 − o(1). This proves part (a) of the Lemma.
It remains to show that the expected number of bit corruptions is at most n/4. This follows
directly from the following fact, which is essentially the Plotkin bound from coding theory:
Claim C.3. If (m, r) is independent of and identically distributed to (m′, r′), then the expectation
of the distance dist(Enc(m, r),Enc(m′, r′)) is at most n/2.
Proof. By linearity of expectation, the expected Hamming distance is the sum, over positions i, of
the probability that Enc(m, r) and Enc(m′, r′) disagree in the ith positions. The probability that
two i.i.d. bits disagree is at most 12 , so the expected distance is at most
n
2 .
Part (b) of the lemma follows since the expected number of errors introduced by the swapping
channel is half of the Hamming distance between the transmitted word and the state vector.
Bounding the Number of Errors. To prove part (2) of Theorem C.1, we will find a (nonuniform)
channel with a hard bound on the number of bits it alters. In logarithmic space, it is easy for the
channel to count the number of bits it has flipped so far and stop altering bits when a threshold
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has been exceeded. The difficult part is to show that such a channel will still cause a significant
probability of decryption error.
As before, the channel will select m′, r′ at random and run the swapping channel Ws with state
s = Enc(m′, r′). In addition, however, it will stop altering bits once the threshold of n(14 + ν) bits
have been exceeded.
Consider now the transmission of a random codeword c = Enc(m, r). Let G be the event that
dist(c, s) 6 n(12 + ν). By a Markov bound, the probability of G is at most
1/2
1/2+ν , and so the
probability of G is 1 − Pr(G¯) > 2ν1+2ν > ν. Conditioned on G, the number of bits altered by Ws
on input c is dominated by Binomial(n(12 + ν),
1
2). The probability that the number of bits altered
exceeds n(14 + ν) is therefore at most exp(−Ω(ν2n)).
On the other hand, conditioned on G there is a significant probability of a decoding error. To
see why this is the case, first note that conditioned on G the error-bounded channel will simulate
Ws(c) nearly perfectly. Moreover, the event G is symmetric in c and s, and so conditioning on G
does not help to distinguish Wc(s) from Ws(c). By the same reasoning as in the previous proof,
Pr(incorrect decoding|G) > 1
2
− o(1) .
Since G has probability at least ν, the channel causes a decoding error with probability at least
ν
2 − o(1), in expectation over the choice of s. Hence, there exists a specific string s∗ for which the
channel causes a decoding error with probability ν2−o(1). This completes the proof of Theorem C.1.
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